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Introduction
As late as 1985, in Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System,' the U.S. Supreme Court observed that "banking and
* Eric Gouvin is Professor of Law at Western New England College School of Law
in Springfield, Massachusetts. This paper was presented to the annual meeting of the
Canadian Law and Economics Association at the University of Toronto on September 26,
1998. This article updates and expands upon a contribution to a symposium on the
global aspects of the law of corporate groups held at the University of Connecticut in
April 1998.
1. 472 U.S. 159 (1985).
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related financial activities are of profound local concern."'2 Such an assess-
ment, however, has been rendered obsolete by recent trends in world bank-
ing. Today, we participate in an increasingly global financial services
marketplace. In North America, some leading U.S. banks report that a
majority of their productive assets are located outside the United States.3
The Canadian Bankers Association touts international banking as the ideal
export.4 Mexico is seriously considering removing restrictions on foreign
ownership of its largest banks.5 North American banking concerns are
moving to form the first truly continental banking organizations. The
Bank of Montreal leads the way in that endeavor, with its commanding
presence in Canada, its ownership of Harris Trust in the United States, and
its major investment in Bancomer in Mexico. 6 However, many major U.S.,
Mexican, and other Canadian banks also have substantial operations
throughout North America. 7
Continent-wide banking in North American emerged as a direct
response to the financial demands of the North American Free Trade Act
(NAFTA).8 In simple terms, increased cross-border trade required the crea-
tion and support of cross-border financial institutions. The need for a
cross-border, North American banking establishment was anticipated by
NAFTA trade negotiators. NAFTA broke new ground by setting out a prin-
ciples-based approach to liberalized trade in financial services as well as
trade in goods. 9 Yet, while the agreement on trade in financial services was
2. Id. at 177 (quoting Lewis v. B.T. Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 38
(1980)).
3. See William H. Lash, III, The Decline of the Nation State in International Trade and
Investment, 18 CARDozo L. REV. 1011, 1017 (1996) (citing the fact that Bankers Trust
reports that 52% of its productive assets are offshore, while Citicorp reports 51% of its
assets fall into that category).
4. See Reforms Needed for Financial Services to Flourish Says CBA, CANADA NEW-
sWiRE, Oct. 29, 1997 (noting that Canadian banks are major exporters, generating 40%
of the their earnings abroad while having 90% of their workforce located in Canada).
5. SeeJonathan Friedland, Mexico's Zedillo Predicts Passage of Reforms, But Warns of
Possible Further Cuts in Spending, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1998, at A13 (describing the
banking reform package proposed by the Zedillo administration).
6. See Drew Clark, Harris Marketers Look to a Mouse That Roars, Am. BANKER, Jan.
7, 1998, at 14 (describing Bank of Montreal's plan to be the first true North American
bank through its operations in Canada, Mexico and the United States).
7. See, e.g., Jonathan Friedland, Citibank Buys Confia of Mexico, WALL ST. J., May
12, 1998, at A14 (noting the acquisition by Citibank of the troubled Confia banking
organization from the Mexican bank-savings protection agency, Fobaproa, thereby step-
ping into a well-established branch system; also noting Bank of America's informal dis-
cussion with Grupo Financiero Banorte SA). See also Stephen L. Fluckiger, The Mexican
Banking Crisis: Remedies and Opportunities, 50 CONS. FIN. L.Q. 76, 82 (1996) (describ-
ing the Mexican operations of Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of Montreal, Wells Fargo, and
NationsBank). See generally John P. Cogan, Jr., Privatization of the Mexican Banking Sys-
tem: Quetzalcoatl and the Bankers, 23 ST. MARY'S LJ. 753, 770 (1992) (noting the pres-
ence of Mexican banking subsidiaries in the United States since 1978).
8. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M.
289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
9. See CallyJordan, Financial Services Under NAFTA: The View From Canada, 9 Rv.
OF BANKING AND FIN. SERviCEs 45, 51 n.39 (Mar. 24, 1993) (noting that NAFTA marks the
"first ever principles-based approach to trade liberalization" in financial services, as
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innovative, it was incomplete. Although NAFTA liberalized access of mem-
ber countries to one another's banking markets, it failed to eliminate all of
the obstacles to free and unfettered cross-border banking.
One of the largest obstacles to cross-border banking involves the dras-
tically divergent banking environments found in the signatory member
countries. 10 While the United States and Canada have well-established
banks and stable currencies, Mexico's banking industry is still evolving
and the peso remains volatile. On the other hand, while Canada and Mex-
ico both have relatively concentrated banking markets in which banking
organizations are free to offer a broad range of financial services, the U.S.
market shares neither of these attributes." NAFTA trade negotiators also
had to take into account the unique banking regulatory scheme in each of
the member countries. For example, they had to recognize that U.S. bank-
ing law separates commercial and investment banking and, at the time of
negotiation, placed significant restrictions on geographic expansion. They
also had to accommodate both Canadian and Mexican laws designed to
ensure domestic ownership of their largest banking institutions and to pre-
vent U.S. encroachment into their home markets through branching.
Given these realities, NAFTA gave the signatory countries a somewhat
more liberal trading regime than had existed previously. However, it did
not resolve the question of how well-integrated a North American banking
organization should be. More specifically, it did not resolve whether there
would be a requirement to force member countries to permit banks from
the other member countries to branch across national borders without hav-
ing to charter a new bank. Therefore, NAFTA left the issue of cross border
branching for future resolution, and memorialized that compromise in sec-
tion 1403(3), which states:
[A]t such time as the United States permits commercial banks of another
Party located in its territory to expand through subsidiaries or direct
branches into substantially all of the United States market, the Parties shall
review and assess market access provided by each Party.. .with a view to
adopting arrangements permitting investors of another Party to choose the
juridical form of establishment of commercial banks. 12
opposed to the "a la carte approach pursued under the FTA [U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Act]"); see also WILLIAM R. WHITE, THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FTA AND NAFTA FOR CANADA
AND MaXIco 9 (1994) ("The FTA was a path-breaking agreement in that it explicitly
treated the issue of trade in financial services and accepted the principle of national
treatment instead of reciprocity.").
10. See Stephen Zamora, Comments on the Regulation of Financial and Legal Services
in Mexico Under NAFTA, 1 U.S.-MEmco LJ. 77 (1993) [hereinafter Zamora, Comments]
(noting the disparities between the U.S. and Mexican banking industries).
11. The U.S. market is served by thousands of banks and thrifts, and stands almost
alone among Western countries in its division between commercial and investment
banking. See WilliamJackson, Glass-Steagall Act/Financial Modernization Issues in the
105th Congress (Congressional Research Serv. No. 16, 1997). In most countries bank-
ing organizations may engage in securities activities either directly through the bank
itself, or, as in Canada, through a securities affiliate in a holding company organization.
Id.
12. NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 1403(3), 32 I.L.M. at 657.
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Under the terms of § 1403(3), the time is now at hand to re-examine the
issue of cross-border branching. Recent U.S. banking law reforms permit
Mexican and Canadian banks located in U.S. territory to branch into sub-
stantially all of the U.S. market.13 Of course, the trade negotiators do not
have the power to unilaterally change the domestic laws of their home
countries. Therefore, the requirement to "review and assess" cross-border
branching contained in § 1403(3) is by no means a guarantee that cross-
border branching will become a reality any time soon. Assuming, however,
that the cross-border branching issue will at least be "reviewed and
assessed" as required by the agreement, this paper considers the possibili-
ties for true cross-border branching in the NAFTA countries.
The paper begins by considering several possible models for the deci-
sionmaking process that will resolve the branching question: the "Expert"
model, the "National Interest" model, and the "Public Choice" model. Of
these three, the Public Choice model is seen as the most useful. Part II
recognizes that the larger bargaining process that will produce an outcome
on the cross-border branching issue is actually composed of a group of
embedded games that are being played out in the regulatory arena and in
the financial services industry. Part II then explores the stakes in the sev-
eral subgames and the incentives for the key rent-seeking groups to affect
the development of North American banking policy. Part III makes predic-
tions about what may happen in the future, concluding that the United
States is unlikely to liberalize foreign branching unless a significant change
in some other area of financial services, such as insurance, makes depar-
ture from the *tatus quo worthwhile. Canada is likely to move toward the
appearance of freer branching without actually making any meaningful
concessions on foreign access to the Canadian retail market. Finally, Mex-
ico is unlikely to allow branching since it is concerned with creating incen-
tives for foreign investment in the existing banking structure rather than
risking any developments that may hinder the precarious recovery of the
Mexican banking system.
I. Models of Analysis
Since the issue of cross-border branching is currently before the NAFTA
member countries, one might imagine how the issue will be decided.
Three different decisionmaking models exist. First is the "Expert" model,
in which a hypothetical disinterested expert versed in international bank-
ing and corporate law makes the objectively "right" decision based on pub-
lic policy considerations. A second approach, the "National Interest"
model, recognizes that even if the countries aspired to achieve the "expert"
result, their national interests might nevertheless require them to try to
establish an international regime that produces a different outcome
designed to maximize their perceived national interest. The third
13. Nationwide branching was made possible by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codi-
fied throughout 12 U.S.C.).
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approach, the "Public Choice" model, analyzes the process as a competi-
tion of various rent-seeking groups - not "nations" with "interests" - to
obtain the maximum benefits from their own point of view.
A. Expert Decisionmaker Model
If we lived in Plato's Republic, the decision about cross border branching
would be an easy one because we would trust our public guardians to make
the wisest decision based on all the facts available. 14 In that world, a disin-
terested expert would be entrusted to make the "right" decision. Our hypo-
thetical expert decisionmaker, not constrained by political realities, would:
(1) identify the problem, (2) define and rank the goals for solving the prob-
lem, (3) specify all the relevant options for meeting the defined goals, (4)
collect data relevant to each option, (5) predict the consequences of each
option on the basis of the data collected, and (6) select the option that best
achieves the goals.' 5 To carry out this analysis, the decisionmaker would
employ the wisdom of macroeconomic theory, which promotes free trade
as a good thing that will increase all participants' wealth, 16 and holds that
a country should eliminate its tariffs even if its trading partners do not
eliminate theirs.17 Liberalizing cross border trade in financial services
should increase competition (or at least the threat of competition) which
could, in turn, reduce prices, help eliminate inefficient regulation and
otherwise improve the market for financial services. 18
The decisionmaker would be familiar with the barriers that prevent
countries from achieving truly free trade. The most obvious barriers are
tariffs, and NAFTA took steps to eliminate tariff barriers on virtually all
goods traded among the NAFTA member countries.19 Our hypothetical
expert, however, would also be aware of the more pernicious problem of
14. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO (Allan Bloom trans., 1968) (Plato articulates a
vision of the Republic in which an elite group of philosophers are specially groomed to
govern).
15. See CARL PATTON & DAVID SAWICKI, THE POLICY ANALYSIS PROCESS: BASIC METH-
ODS oF POLICY ANALYSIS AND PLANNING 26-38 (1986) (articulating the traditional
approach to public policy analysis); see also JOHN SPANIER & ERIC M. USLANDER, HOW
Ar mwCAm FOREIGN POLICY IS MADE 103 (2d ed. 1978) (describing a similar process in the
"rational actor" model of decision making).
16. See N. GREGORY MANKIUW, MACROECONOMICS 202-04 (3d ed. 1997) (setting forth
the widely accepted view that protectionist trade policies have no affect on the trade
balance even though they do affect the amount of trade and noting that trade benefits all
countries whereas protectionism makes everyone worse off even if it produces some win-
ners within a society).
17. See DAVID FRIEDMAN, HIDDEN ORDER 282-87 (1996) (providing a simple mathe-
matical proof of why elimination of tariffs, even on a unilateral basis, is wealth
maximizing).
18. See Ernesto Aguirre, International Economic Integration and Trade in Financial
Services: Analysis from a Latin American Perspective, 27 L. & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 1057,
1060 (1996) (stating that "liberalization may raise the average efficiency of industry,
and this should be reflected in lower prices for financial services and products").
19. NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 302(2) (describing five different categories of goods
and tariff phase-out schedules for each, with the last tariffs to be eliminated by January
1, 2008).
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non-tariff barriers to trade.20
In the case of cross-border banking, non-tariff barriers generally
involve regulation in the host country to which the firm is not subject in its
home country. Because of the difficulties with the burdens of host country
regulation, some firms will decide not to do business "in" the host country,
but will only do business "with" trading partners located in the host coun-
try on terms designed to consider the transaction as having occurred in the
firm's home country territory.21 In the banking area, for example, foreign
banks may use the "representative office" device to solicit business with
firms in the host country without actually doing business in the host
country.22
This strategy can be risky because it is difficult at times for a foreign
firm to know whether it is engaging in trade "in" the country instead of
merely "with" the country. 23 Our hypothetical expert would cringe at such
a situation.
Ideally, the location of the trade should not factor in the trading par-
ties' decision. The hypothetical expert would likely reach- the conclusion
that all member states should have the same regulations affecting banking
and therefore should all commit to harmonizing their respective regulatory
schemes to relieve firms from having the incentive to avoid doing business
in one country or another. Unfortunately for our hypothetical expert,
under NAFTA ground rules, large scale harmonization of legal regimes is
not on the table.24
20. See JoAN EDELMAN SPERO, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
82-83 (2d ed. 1981) (describing and discussing the general problem of non-tariff barri-
ers to trade).
21. Doing business in a country frequently requires complying with more onerous
licensing and regulatory obligations. See Guillermo Marrero, What Foreigners Should
Know About the Mexican Market, in NAFTA. WinAT You NEED TO KNOW Now 119, 125
(Practicing Law Institute ed., 1994) (describing the distinction between doing business
with and doing business in Mexico).
22. Typically, a "representative office" does not solicit loans or take deposits, but
instead acts as a liaison to make it easier for potential borrowers or depositors in the
host country to transact business with the foreign bank in the bank's home country. See
HAL S. SCOTT AND PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY,
AND REGULATION 135 (4th ed. 1997). For.example, even though Mexico has traditionally
closed its banking market to foreign firms, foreign banks have nevertheless been permit-
ted to maintain representative offices in the country. See Ghislain Gouraige, Jr., Recent
Development, 24 HARv. INT'L LJ. 212, 214 n.19 (1983) (noting that at the time Mexico
nationalized the Mexican banks there were over 100 representative offices of foreign
banks in Mexico).
23. See Marrero, supra note 21 (noting that in Mexico, a business will be considered
doing business in the country if it regularly or continuously executes commercial trans-
actions there).
24. See Joel P. Trachtman, Trade in Financial Services Under GATS, NAFTA and the
EC: A Regulatory Jurisdiction Analysis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 94 (1995) (not-
ing that NAFTA does not require financial regulation harmonization); but see Stephen
Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems: The Side Effects of Free
Trade, 12 Amiz. J. INr'L & COMP. L. 401 (1995) [hereinafter Zamora, Harmonization]
(arguing that increased cross-border contact between businesspeople, bureaucrats, law-
yers, academics and others will inevitably lead to a beneficial exchange of ideas in each
of the three countries); and Alfred C. Aman, Jr., A Global Perspective on Current Regula-
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With that in mind, the expert would instead have to consider which of
the three primary methods of engaging in cross-border banking is "best"
for all the players involved. The three methods of cross-border business are
the following: (1) having no legal presence in the host country, (2) having
a limited presence in the host country, and (3) being fully present in the
host country.
The first method calls for banking firms to remain in their home coun-
tries and do business with customers in the host country without actually
having a legal presence there. In general, there are two ways to pursue this
strategy: by doing business "with" instead of "in" the country; or by stay-
ing in the home country while accepting the fact that transactions are
occurring "in" the host country, and complying with host country rules as
a cost of doing business. With regard to the first strategy, foreign banks
must be especially careful about the volume and frequency of their transac-
tions.25 As a result, firms that attempt to employ this strategy as a method
of entering the foreign market do not participate in the foreign market to
the full extent that a true competitor in that market would. This may be a
good strategy for the foreign firm. In the foreign market, however, limited
participation does not provide the benefits of competition that economists
predict.
With regard to the second strategy, it may be possible for some finan-
cial service providers, such as cash managers, mortgage servicers and data
processors, to comply fully with host country regulation while engaging in
the activity from their home country location.2 6 This may be a profitable
approach for firms pursuing certain lines of business, but for most finan-
cial service providers a physical presence in the host country will be either
necessary or convenient to their business operations.
A second method to cross-border banking would be for the banking
firm to have a limited presence in the host country, thereby allowing lim-
ited participation in the banking business. Variations on this approach
include the "correspondent bank" approach and the "consortium"
approach, whereby a foreign bank establishes an affiliation with a local
bank and the ultimate customer does business with the foreign bank
through the offices of the local bank or a joint venture.2 7 A common U.S.
tory Reforms: Rejection, Relocation, or Reinvention?, 2 GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. J. 429 (1995)
(arguing that global political and economic forces push national policies towards dereg-
ulation and privatization).
25. See Marrero, supra note 21.
26. For example, some aspects of the Mexican market could be exploited without an
actual physical presence in Mexico. Of course, large loans to major borrowers and gov-
ernment units can be arranged that way, while consumer banking services like credit
cards could be offered in Mexico and serviced in the United States. See Karen MacAl-
lister, Note, NAFTA: How the Banks in the United States and Mexico Will Respond, 17
Hous. J. INT'L L. 273, 295 (1994) (suggesting that credit cards, ATM networks and resi-
dential mortgages may be a lucrative and easily penetrated market for U.S. banks desir-
ing to do business with Mexico).
27. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, THE REGULATION OF BANKING 859-60 (1992) (quoting
Haley & Seligman, The Development of International Banking in the United States for a
description of the correspondent banking and consortium approaches).
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variant on the limited access strategy is to use the "agency" device that
foreign banks typically employ in the United States. Agencies are essen-
tially special purpose banks that are permitted to engage in certain aspects
of the banking business, but are generally prohibited from accepting
deposits. 28 These limited entries into the host country market suffer from
potential shortcomings. Similar to the problems of not physically entering
the host market at all, entering on a limited basis also leaves foreign banks
poorly situated to participate in the broad financial services market so the
benefits of increased competition might not be fully realized.
Assuming a foreign banking organization wants to participate fully in
the host country banking market, our enlightened expert would have to
consider the best way for foreign banks to have a physical presence in the
host country. As a practical matter that decision comes down to a choice
between a regime requiring the establishment of banking subsidiaries or
one permitting cross-border branching from the home country.
1. Subsidiaries
The subsidiary approach to expansion has its strengths and weaknesses.
Commentators have long recognized that the greatest strength of the sub-
sidiary device is to insulate the parent from liabilities arising out of the
subsidiary's activities. 29 There are some widely accepted public policy
benefits of allowing limited liability for corporations generally, such as:
permitting absentee investors to avoid exposure to risk, permitting large-
scale enterprise, allowing diversification of portfolios, avoiding increased
agency costs, avoiding impairment of the efficient capital market, avoiding
increased collection costs for creditors, avoiding the costs of contracting
around liability, and encouraging risk-taking.3 0 It has been noted, how-
ever, that in the subsidiary context, many of these traditional justifications
for limited liability may become irrelevant. 3 1
Nevertheless, the subsidiary form offers additional benefits that may
appropriately be considered by business planners when establishing the
structure of the firm. Some of the benefits include: avoiding restrictions in
the parent's charter or restrictions'arising under law, limiting tax implica-
tions, avoiding complications arising from "foreign corporation" status,
increasing the morale of the subsidiary's management, settling shareholder
disputes, helping public relations, complying with regulatory ownership
requirements, or establishing certain procedural benefits, such as venue
and jurisdiction.3 2
28. See MICHAEL GRUSON & RALPH REISNER, REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS 1-26 to 1-28
(2d ed. 1995) (describing the agency device).
29. See CHESTER ROHLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
§ 10.02 (5th ed. 1975).
30. See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAw OF CORPORATE GROUPS - SUBSTANTIVE LAW 66-
86 (1987); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FiSCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STmUC-
ruE OF CORPORATE LAw 40-62 (1991).
31. See BLUMBERG, supra note 30, at 93-99.
32. See ROHLICH, supra note 29 (noting various legal reasons for subsidiary forma-
tion); LARRY A. SODERQUIST & A.A. SOMMER, JR., UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAw 238-41
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On the other hand, some commentators have argued that any theoreti-
cal advantages are outweighed by the disadvantages of limited liability in
the corporate group context. Specifically, these include: unfairness and
inefficiency for tort and other involuntary creditors, unfairness and ineffi-
ciency for labor claimants, the encouragement of excessive risk taking,
increased information and monitoring costs, impairment of the efficiency
of the market, and the possibility of misrepresentation. 33 Others have
argued that the limited liability aspect of subsidiaries is economically inef-
ficient and therefore undesirable.34 Despite these criticisms, the limited
liability feature of corporate subsidiaries is an essential aspect of that
device.
As a practical matter, however, the greatest drawback to the subsidiary
form may be the cost of establishing and maintaining a separate legal
entity. A subsidiary bank must comply with all licensing and regulatory
requirements. A free-standing subsidiary bank must have a complete inter-
nal infrastructure, capital base, and management team. All of these
requirements cost money. Even after overcoming the burdens of establish-
ing the subsidiary, the newly formed bank will suffer from a somewhat
limited lending capacity because loan limits are typically a function of the
subsidiary's capital. Because of the expense of establishing and operating
subsidiaries, subsidiaries seem to be less attractive than branches. 35
From a public policy perspective, another drawback to the subsidiary
form in the financial services industry is that the use of banking subsidiar-
ies tends to aggravate the moral hazard problem.36 In the subsidiary con-
text, one risk is that a holding company might not run the bank prudently
due to the limited risk of loss and the limited liability of the parent for the
bank's obligations.37 In the United States, the moral hazard problem in the
bank holding company/bank subsidiary context has resulted in an ongo-
ing effort by regulators to invent new and better ways of imposing liability
on holding companies for the failure of their bank subsidiaries. Federal
(1990) (citing use of subsidiaries in corporate acquisitions); and Joseph H. Sommer, The
Subsidiary: Doctrine Without a Cause?, 59 FoP, DH~ L. REv. 227, 259-73 (1990) (citing
use of subsidiary as an effective method for controlling choice of law and venue).
33. See BLUMBERG, supra note 30, at 74-83; see generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
supra note 30.
34. See Sommer, supra note 32, at 231-42.
35. See Hal Scott, Supervision of International Banking Post-BCCI, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REv.
487, 491 (1992) ("The competitive superiority of branches is reflected in the fact that of
the $800 billion total of foreign bank assets in the United States, $626 billion is in
branches and agencies of foreign banks - only $174 billion is in subsidiaries.").
36. The idea of moral hazard is present in any situation where the existence of some
kind of insurance or cost-shifting is perceived to reduce the incentives to reduce or mini-
mize loss. See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 T-x. L. REv. 237, 238
(1996) (providing a history of the term "moral hazard" and criticizing its use in the
debate over the reform of various government programs on the ground that the condi-
tions necessary to give the concept force in economic theory do not-exist in the real
world).
37. See William A. Lovett, Moral Hazard, Bank Supervision and Risk-Based Capital
Requirements, 49 OHIO ST. LJ. 1365, 1365-77 (1989) (describing the moral hazard prob-
lem in the banking context).
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banking regulators have devised a host of legal techniques designed to
impose liability on bank holding companies in the event of bank failure.38
Although the federal efforts have been criticized as over-zealous in some
situations,39 there are times when a holding company should bear some
responsibility for the failure of its subsidiary.40 The subsidiary arrange-
ment makes the imposition of that liability somewhat problematic.
2. Branching
Presently, all three NAFTA countries permit banks from other member
countries to expand into their territory by establishing separately
chartered subsidiaries in the host country. In contrast, Mexico and Can-
ada currently do not permit foreign bank branching into their respective
territories.41 From the point of view of the parent banking organization,
branching should be more economically attractive than setting up an
independent subsidiary because capital, accounting, and legal costs can be
shared more easily.42 In the United States, operations may be more easily
integrated because §§ 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act do not apply
to transactions between branches, whereas they do restrict transactions
between commonly controlled subsidiaries.43 In addition, loans generated
38. These regulatory mechanisms include the so-called source of strength doctrine,
12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a) (1996), cross guarantee provisions, 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e) (Supp.
1994), capital restoration plans, 12 U.S.C. § 1831 o(e)(2)(C)(ii) (1996), regulatory
agreements, the elaboration of a general fiduciary duty to regulators, equitable subordi-
nation, preferences, and fraudulent conveyances. See Eric J. Gouvin, Shareholder
Enforced Market Discipline: How Much is Too Much?, 16 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 311, 333-
45 (1997) [hereinafter Gouvin, Market Discipline] (describing the various regulatory
methods in light of a pervasive scheme to impose liability on holding companies).
39. See Gouvin, Market Discipline, supra note 38, at 345-54 (arguing that the federal
response to the moral hazard problem is an example of regulatory overkill that results in
unanticipated negative consequences).
40. See EricJ. Gouvin, Of Hungry Wolves and Horizontal Conflicts: Rethinking the
Justifications for Bank Holding Company Liability 51-78 (Nov. 12, 1997) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author) (arguing that holding companies should be liable to
third parties for bank failure only to the extent the directors of the subsidiary owed a
duty to non-shareholders (including the bank as an entity) and failed to carry out those
duties).
41. See Larry M. Greenberg, Canada's Banks Question Their Cocoon, WALL ST. J., Apr.
16, 1998, at A17 (noting that of the world's 50 largest economies, only Canada and
Mexico do not allow foreign banks to branch into their territory, although Canada has
indicated that it will introduce legislation designed to permit wholesale banking through
branches).
42. See Zamora, Comments, supra note 10, at 79 (noting economies achieved through
branching).
43. Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c-371c-1
(1994) impose significant restrictions on transactions among affiliates within a holding
company organization. Section 23A restricts transactions such as loans or extensions of
credit, purchase of securities or other assets, and the issuance of various kinds of accom-
modation between a bank and an affiliate unless they meet certain quantitative and
qualitative limits. Id. Section 23B extends the restrictions in 23A by prohibiting certain
transactions outright and subjecting additional transactions to the constraint that they
be on terms comparable to those that they would obtain in an arm's length transaction.
See JoNATHAN R. MAcEy & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION, 398-401
(2d ed. 1997).
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by a branch can be made based on the capital of the home bank in the
home country instead of on the branch's capital.44 This typically permits
much higher loan limits. On the other hand, liabilities of the branch will
be imposed on the home office more readily than the obligations of a sepa-
rately organized subsidiary would be.45 Although local regulators are
likely to have less control over a branch because the regulator in the home
country will have primary responsibility, the branch is likely to be more
stable because of the bank's greater worldwide capital.46
Corporate law offers two insights regarding the question of whether
subsidiaries or branches are preferable from a public policy point of view.
In the first view, branches are preferable to subsidiaries because, from a
moral hazard perspective, the home bank should dearly be responsible for
the branch's obligations. The second view argues that international bank-
ing law should permit both methods of expansion so corporate planners
can exercise their own judgment about which form makes the most sense
for a particular bank in a particular situation. NAFTA adopted the second
approach.47 Section 1403(1) states that investors of a Party should be free
to establish financial institutions in the other countries "in the juridical
form chosen by such investor."48 The import of that provision is that
banks should be able to expand across borders by establishing either
branches or subsidiaries as dictated by their business plan rather than by
banking law.
This, of course, is the "best" decision from a public policy point of
view.49 It allows private parties to make decisions that order their prefer-
ences without regard to the law. From the perspective of free trade, it
allows parties to eliminate the non-tariff barrier that otherwise would
accompany the required subsidiary form. From the banking law perspec-
44. See GRusON & REisN-R, supra note 28, at 1-26 (noting that branch lending limits
are based on the capital of the foreign parent).
45. See Wells Fargo Asia, Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 936 F.2d 723 (2d Cir, 1991), cert.
denied, 505 U.S. 1204 (1992) (holding that absent a contractual restriction on the place
of collection, a customer of a foreign branch may recover from the bank's home office in
the United States the amount of the obligation). The risk of foreign sovereign actions
that make meeting obligations impossible was addressed somewhat by amendments in
1994 to the Federal Reserve Act and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Those acts
changed the law to hold the U.S. home offices liable for such obligations only if agreed
to in writing. See Eric Palace, Comment, International Banking- Foreign Banks Operating
in the United States, 14 AxN. REV. BANKING L. 154, 169 (1995) (describing the
amendments).
46. See Scott, supra note 35, at 491 (noting that local deposits of branch are backed
by home office capital).
47. See NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 1403(1), 32 I.L.M. at 657 (recognizing the princi-
ple that investors should be able to choose the juridical form to use for cross-border
banking).
48. See id.
49. See George J. Betston, International Regulatory Coordination of Banking, in THE
INTERNATIONALISATION OF CAPITAL MARETS AND THE REGULATORY RESPONSE 197, 206-07
(John Fingleton ed., 1992) (noting that "it is well known that competitive markets are
promoted when entry (including branching) is not constrained.. ." and concluding that
unless an important policy weighs against free entry, protectionist barriers should be
eliminated).
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tive, it allows the parties to employ the method of expansion that best suits
their strategic needs, whether those needs are protection from liability
afforded by the subsidiary or integration of operation provided by the
branching mechanism. From the perspective of corporate law, it allows the
parties to decide if the host country activities will be liabilities of the home
country bank in all cases or only in special cases. Thus, the drafters of
NAFTA arrived at the same conclusion that our hypothetical expert would
have reached. Of course, the actual decision on cross-border branching
will not be decided by the expert because no such decision-maker exists.
The idea of an all-knowing expert who can objectively perform a rational
assessment and produce an objectively "right" answer seems somewhat
naive.50
B. National Interest Model
A more realistic way of thinking about trade agreements is to assume that
in an international environment characterized by extensive economic inter-
dependence, each trade negotiator will advocate for the implementation of
the "international regime" that best serves the interests of the negotiator's
own country.51 The country's national interest may be informed by a pub-
lic-spirited inquiry into the "best" approach to the problem, or it may be
more nefarious, recognizing that sometimes nations choose to take action
that is not theoretically ideal because it will enhance interests within the
nation at the expense of other parties. With every negotiator urging his or
her "national interest," an agreement develops that is informed by rational
self-interest, but which may give rise to conflict upon implementation.52
This approach, while better than the expert decisionmaker model, nev-
ertheless suffers from some shortcomings. Most importantly, to the extent
the model rests on nations advancing national interests through the propa-
gation of international regimes, it may be misleading. In the real world,
nations do not have "interests." Because groups do not speak with one
voice, attempts to determine a particular interest or purpose must fail.5 3
Although some scholars have argued that in some situations government
50. See THoMAs 0. McGARiTY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY xvi (1991) (observing that "data analysis is expen-
sive, cost and benefit assessment models are inaccurate, biases can subtly creep into
'objective' analyses, and the uncertainties are sometimes so huge and pervasive as to
render the idea of objectivity virtually meaningless").
51. See ROBERT 0. KEOHANE &JOSEPH S. NYE, PoWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 5 (1977)
("By creating or accepting procedures, rules or institutions for certain kinds of activity,
governments regulate and control transnational and interstate relations. We refer to
these governing arrangements as "international regimes.").
52. See Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of Interna-
tional Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDozo L. REv. 925,
930-32 (1996) (describing the national interest view as "regime theory" in which negoti-
ators seek to advance the interests of states).
53. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 533, 54748
(1983); see also EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECK-AUsER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS
257-86 (1978) (discussing the difficulties of articulating a meaningful standard for
social welfare).
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actors are capable of acting (or at least of aspiring to act) for the common
good,54 the more convincing view is that the challenge of aggregating indi-
vidual preference makes determination of a group (or national) preference
extremely difficult if not impossible.55 As public choice scholars have
amply demonstrated, voting procedures employed in a group decision mak-
ing process can determine the outcome. 56
Another flaw in the National Interest approach is that it fails to recog-
nize that government actors in the various countries have their own agen-
das to pursue and are in fact players in their own right in the political/
economic power struggle.57 Regulators' interests are pivotal in the develop-
ment of North American banking policy. Therefore, although the National
Interest model may be useful in some situations,58 it does not work as well
as a model that takes into account the interests of individual economic
actors and regulators.
C. Public Choice Model
A government often takes a position because interest groups within the
nation have successfully compelled government action.5 9 The public
54. The neo-republican model of politics views the political process as a method of
solving problems for the common good. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What is Republican-
ism, and is it Worth Reviving? 102 HARv. L. REv. 1695, 1698 (1987); Frank Michelman,
Law's Republic, 97 YALE L. J. 1493, 1503-04 (1988). The neo-republican model holds
that at least some problems can be addressed with substantively "right" answers for the
public good without regard to political ideology or individual preferences. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1539, 1541 (1988).
55. This key insight owes much to the work of Kenneth Arrow, who developed the
famous theorem that bears his name. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem holds that under
certain conditions it is impossible to aggregate the preferences of a given group because
the way in which voting is conducted could result in an infinite cycling of choices. For a
useful summary of Arrow's Theorem and its larger implications, see SHAUN HARGREAVES
HEAPr A.., THE THEORY OF CHOICE: A CmncAL GUIDE, 209-15 (1992).
56. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FicKEY, LAW AN,'D PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRn-
CAL INTRODUcTION 38-42 (1991). If the agenda develops through an open process where
each legislator can propose an alternative, then the outcome of majority rule may
wander anywhere because of preference cycling problems. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Pros-
pects for Formal Models of Legislatures, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5, 10 (1985). For an example
of the cycling problem, see Eric J. Gouvin, Truth in Savings and the Failure of Legislative
Methodology, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1281, 1346-47 n.233 (1994) [hereinafter Gouvin, Truth
in Savings] (illustrating the cycling problem with a hypothetical committee vote).
57. See Edward J. Kane, Tension Between Competition and Coordination in Interna-
tional Financial Regulation, in GOVERNING BANING'S FtruRE: MARKErs vS. REGULATION
33, 34 (Catherine England ed., 1991), [hereinafter Kane, Tension] (describing the need
of regulators to maximize the value of their enterprise within the confines of what he
terms the "microeconomic analysis of regulation," which is consistent with the public
choice view).
58. The model gives a creditable, though not perfect, account of U.S.-Canadian rela-
tions, for instance. See KEoHANE & NYE, supra note 51, at 165-218 (employing regime
theory to explain the outcomes of several U.S./Canada cross-border conflicts during the
twentieth century).
59. From the point of view of public choice theorists, government action, especially
in the form of legislation and regulation, is nothing more than a product that effects a
wealth transfer from one group to another. For a general discussion, see Robert D. Tol-
lison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REv. 339 (1988). The idea of government
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choice 60 perspective on international agreements suggests that countries
will not agree to terms in a treaty unless the key interest groups in the
country agree and the regulators who deal with the matter find it in their
own best interests. 6 1
Therefore, in light of the many demands of the constituents they deal
with, we would expect trade negotiators to make agreements that maximize
their own interest groups' competitive positions, even if the theoretically
optimal position would be somewhat different. Any attempt at regional
integration will succeed only if the self-interests of key actors and interest
groups within the region coincide. 6 2 In the case of NAFTA, the interest
groups concerned about cross-border financial services include, most obvi-
ously, the financial services industry and the regulators who oversee those
firms.
The interest groups in each of the member nations are likely to have
different perspectives on the attractiveness of cross-border branching.
After the necessary bargaining for government action, we can reasonably
expect that the trade representatives of the member countries will not com-
promise the positions of their clients for their trading partners. Of course,
the representatives should remember the basic lesson of Economics 101,
that liberal trade is good for everyone. They are also likely to understand
that they could easily fall into a prisoner's dilemma if they pursue their
own economic self-interest too vigorously.63 The parties will try to balance
these concerns while simultaneously pressing for private advantage.
Unfortunately, when all is said and done, an examination of the relative
action as a bargained for exchange can readily be applied to the international trade situa-
tion by considering that the government's action in negotiating the trade agreement is
the action for which competing groups are bargaining. See Colombatto & Macey, supra
note 52 (examining the difference between regime theory and public choice theory).
60. Public choice scholars draw heavily on economics, game theory, organizational
behavior and political science. See generally FARBER & FicKEY, supra note 56, at 21-33;
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tax. L. REv.
873, 878-79, 883, 901-06 (1987) (arguing that a general theory of "public choice" is
impossible because there are many variations on the set of core principles that have
inspired many scholars); HEAP, supra note 55, at 209-15 (1992) (giving a useful overview
of the topic, especially the theoretical problems of aggregating preferences, which tend to
make the output of collective bodies incoherent).
61. See Colombatto & Macey, supra note 52, at 932 ("Public choice theory... posits
that international institutions are vehicles through which politicians, bureaucrats, and
interest groups reflect their own interests.").
62. See Frederick M. Abbott, Foundation-Building for Western Hemispheric Integra-
tion, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 900, 902 (1996-97) (discussing various interest groups,
such as business groups, labor groups, environmental groups, citizen groups and gov-
ernment actors, whose interests would have to coincide in order to expand NAFTA into
the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and noting that "the success of a regional integra-
tion effort may well depend on the presence of a sufficient confluence of self-interest
among key actors and interest groups throughout economically-important countries in a
region.").
63. See Jeffrey Simser, GATS and Financial Services: Redefining Borders, 3 Bu'r. J.
INT'L L. 33, 40 (1996) (noting the propensity for states negotiating a trade pact to
become subject to a prisoner's dilemma).
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interests of the affected regulators and industry participants reveals that
cross-border branching is a deadlocked issue.
II. Public Choice Model Examined
The resolution of the cross-border branching issue under NAFTA can be
seen as a complicated game among the trade negotiators of the three mem-
ber countries. Any attempt to map out the strategies of the parties will
quickly stall on the realization that the three players' strategies are part of a
much larger and more complicated game that includes several embedded
games played by other rent-seekers in their respective home countries.64
The rent-seeking interests that compete for favorable treatment from the
trade negotiators are complex and emanate from two key sources: regula-
tors and financial services providers. The concerns of these two groups
have both national and international aspects.
A. Rent-Seeking Behavior of Regulators
In all three NAFTA countries, financial services policymakers must balance
the inevitable economic pressures to move toward a more open marketplace
against demands for protectionist measures to counteract the dislocations
brought about by market forces.65 In addition, regulators must be careful
to protect their own interests and to ensure implementation of a regulatory
regime that maximizes the value of their respective regulatory enter-
prises.66 The regulators must also compete to maximize their interests in
both the domestic and the international arenas. It is likely that this com-
plex game will play out differently in each of the several NAFTA countries.
The outcome of the domestic games may have an international effect.
1. Domestic Rent-Seeking by Regulators
a. The United States
In the United States, the number of players in the financial services regula-
tory area is bewildering. Government actors involved in one way or
another include state bank regulators, the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC), the
Office of Thrift Supervision, the Department of the Treasury, and the Fed-
eral Reserve Board (Fed). All of these actors share a complicated and
redundant regulatory scheme governing U.S. banks.67 In addition, there
64. For a general discussion of embedded games and the structure of large games,
see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD Er Au., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 188-202 (1994) (providing an
overview of the problems of modeling large games).
65. Cf. Arthur J. Cockfield, Tax Integration Under NAFTA: Resolving the Conflict
Between Economic and Sovereignty Interests, 34 STAN. J. IN'L L. 39 n.2 (1998) (noting this
conflict in the tax area).
66. See Kane, Tension, supra note 57, at 34.
67. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANK OVERSIGHT STRUCTURE: U.S. AND FOREIGN
EXPERIENCE MAY OFFER LESSONS FOR MODERNIZING U.S. STRUCTURE 36-56 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter GAO OVERSIGHT STRUCTURE] (describing the redundant function of the federal bank-
ing regulators).
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are state level regulators for insurance and securities activities, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission covers the securities market at the
federal level. None of these actors will voluntarily give up their regulatory
power without good reason. Predictably, on the several occasions when
Congress considered reforming the financial services regulatory scheme,
the regulators mobilized political opposition to protect the existing "turf'
controlled by each agency.68
The most notorious of these turf wars has been the ongoing struggle
between the Federal Reserve and the Comptroller of the Currency over the
appropriate 'corporate structure for groups of banks and related financial
services providers. The conflict between these two key regulators appears
to be the path dependent 69 result of historical policy decisions affecting
branching in the United States.70 The historical adoption of restrictive
rules for branching resulted in the bank holding company becoming the
dominant form of organization for the U.S. banking industry. This kind of
consequence may be an example of what Sj. Leibowitz and Stephen Mar-
golis call ."second degree path dependence."71 This term refers to a situa-
tion in which an initial decision is made and "the inferiority of the chosen
path is unknowable at the time the choice was made, but it is later recog-
nized that some alternative path would have yielded greater wealth."72
Today policy makers are debating whether the holding company is a more
or less efficient structure for the banking industry than the operating sub-
sidiary model.
The complex product line barriers that pepper U.S. banking law, rein-
forced by the holding company form with its many regulatory "firewalls,"
are increasingly viewed by banks, insurance companies, and securities
68. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of
Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 Bus. LAw. 447, 447-48
(1995) (chronicling the turf wars that erupt whenever serious proposals to reform U.S.
making law are advanced); see also EdwardJ. Kane, The Evolving U.S. Legislative Agenda
in Banking and Finance, in REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL INSTITrTONS IN THE
NAFTA Courms AND BEYOND 180, 186-88 (George M. von Furstenberg ed., 1997)
[hereinafter Kane, Legislative Agenda] (describing one round in the on-going battle
between the Fed and the OCC over the structure of bank activities).
69. Path dependency occurs in situations where subsequent developments in a par-
ticular phenomenon are dependent to a great extent on initial conditions. Once those
initial conditions are set, the developments that follow tend to be "locked in" to the
original condition. The classic example of historical lock in is the "QWERTY" keyboard
used on typewriters and computers. See Paul David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,
75 Am. EcoN. REv. 332 (1985).
70. For a brief discussion of the evolution of U.S. branching policy, see Eric J.
Gouvin, Cross-Border Bank Branching Under the NAFTA: Public Choice and the Law of
Corporate Groups, 13 CONN. J. oF INr'L L. (forthcoming, 1998).
71. See Sj. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In and History,
11 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 205, 207 (1995) (describing the idea of "second degree" path
dependence).
72. Id. at 207 (noting that in the case of second degree path dependence, "sensitive
dependence on initial conditions leads to outcomes that are regrettable and costly to
change. They are not, however, inefficient in any meaningful sense, given the assumed
limitations of knowledge.").
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firms as obstacles to business. 73 Industry desires to be free of the restric-
tive provisions of existing banking law, and the requirements that non-
banking activities be carried out through a holding company structure,
obtained some relief in 1997. At that time, the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency promulgated regulations permitting national banks to engage in
activities incidental to banking through so-called operating subsidiaries of
the bank itself, without the need for a bank holding company structure. 74
Although the Federal Reserve, at about the same time, also liberalized its
treatment of bank holding companies, 75 the OCC operating subsidiary reg-
ulation set off a major debate in Washington over what the ownership
structure of financial services providers should look like.
Not surprisingly, the Federal Reserve, as the prime regulator of bank
holding companies, insists that the bank holding company form is the best
way to proceed, while the OCC, the chief regulator of national banks,
favors a system comprised of bank operating subsidiaries.76 Although
many observers see this long-running battle as little more than territorial
positioning,77 the debate ostensibly turns on the question of whether the
banking industry enjoys a subsidy from the federal government, 78 and, if
73. See J. Virgil Mattingly & Keiran J. Fallon, Understanding the Issues Raised by
Financial Modernization, 2 N.C. BANKING INsT. 25, 26-27 (1998) (reporting the frustra-
tions of industry participants).
74. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34() (1997). The Comptroller of the Currency has promul-
gated a regulation that permits national banks to form operating subsidiaries that may
engage in several new activities, such as equipment leasing, insurance, real estate broker-
age, real estate development, and securities underwriting. Id. Given that most states
have parity or "wild card" statutes, which by law grant their state-chartered institutions
powers at least as liberal as the powers given to national banks, the extent of liberalized
banking powers in the banking system as a whole is quite extensive. CoNFERENCE OF
STATE BANK SuPERvisoRs, A PROFILE OF STATE CARTER BANKING 156-58 (1996). For a
discussion of the new provisions, see James R. Smoot, Bank Operating Subsidiaries: Free
At Last or More of The Same?, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 651 (1997) (analyzing the OCC operat-
ing subsidiary regulations).
75. The Federal Reserve Board has loosened the restrictions between banks and
their securities affiliates within the holding company structure. See Review of Restric-
tions on Director and Employee Interlocks, Cross-Marketing Activities and Purchase and
Sale of Financial Assets, 61 Fed. Reg. 57,679 (1996) (easing or eliminating restrictions
on personnel interlocks, marketing activities, and financial transactions between a bank
and a securities affiliate); Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of
Bank Holding Companies Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities, 61 Fed.
Reg. 68,750 (1996) (increasing from 10% to 25% the amount of total revenue that a
nonbank subsidiary of a bank holding company may derive from underwriting and
dealing in securities in which the bank is prohibited from dealing). In addition, the
Federal Reserve has completely overhauled Regulation Y, the regulation that covers bank
holding companies, to loosen existing restrictions and add new activities to the list of
those approved as being "closely related to banking." See Melanie L. Fein, Fed's Proposed
Overhaul of Regulation Y Goes Far, But Could Be Bolder, 15 BANKING POL'Y. REP. 4 (Oct.
21, 1996) (describing the proposed changes to Regulation Y).
76. See Michael Schroeder, Greenspan, Rubin Duel Over Banking Overhaul, WALL ST.
J., June 3, 1998, at A20; Alan Yonan, Jr., Fed's Greenspan Backs Bill Rubin Opposes, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 18, 1998, at A6.
77. See Kane, Legislative Agenda, supra note 68, at 186-88 (noting the ongoing turf
battle between the Fed and the OCC).
78. See David G. Oedel, Puzzling Banking Law: Its Effects and Purposes, 67 U. CoLo.
L. REv. 477, 479 (1996) ("banking law enshrines fundamental economic inefficiencies
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so, whether the law should attempt to confine the benefit of that subsidy to
the bank itself. The Federal Reserve Board clearly believes that the safety
net created to protect federal banks provides the banking industry with a
subsidy vis-a-vis other financial services providers.79 Although Chairman
Greenspan sees the creation of a banking subsidy as an "undesirable but
unavoidable consequence of creating a safety net,"80 he believes that the
subsidy should be contained within the bank in order to prevent the trans-
fer of the sovereign credit subsidy for non-banking purposes. Such a trans-
fer might result in a "subsidized competitive advantage" to the bank
affiliate.81
Others, most notably the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
question whether a net subsidy to the U.S. banking industry exists.82 Of
course, bankers do not believe they receive a subsidy and they point to
deposit insurance premiums, capital requirements, and regulatory costs as
evidence that they pay for whatever benefit they receive from the safety
net.83 Officials from the FDIC and the Department of Treasury have also
raised questions about the existence of a subsidy, especially in light of reg-
ulation costS.8 4
in banking that are tolerable for banks because of breathtaking anti-competitive protec-
tions and financial subsidies - protections and subsidies that are not always apparent to
outsiders nor admitted publicly by banking savants.").
79. See generally MYRON L. KWAST & S. WAYNE PASSMORE, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE SUBSIDY PROVIDED BY THE FEDERAL SAFETY NET: THEORY,
MEASUREMENT AND CONTAINMENT (1997) (articulating a theory that the government's
commitment to the prevention of a systematic banking crisis provides a subsidy to
banks); see also Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit
of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services (Feb. 13, 1997), in 83 FED. RES.
BULL. 249 (1997) [hereinafter Greenspan Statement] (stating "In this century the Con-
gress has delegated the use of sovereign credit - the power to create money and borrow
unlimited funds at the lowest possible rate - to support the banking system. It has done
so indirectly as a consequence of deposit insurance, Federal Reserve discount window
access, and final riskless payment system transactions .... [As a result of the govern-
ment's major role in protecting the banking system, banks get an unfair advantage over
other financial services providers because banks] determine the level of risk-taking and
receive gains therefrom, but do not bear the full costs of that risk. The remainder of the
risk is transferred to the government.").
80. Greenspan Statement, supra note 79, at 250.
81. Id.
82. See GAR WHALEN, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE COMPETI-
TV E IMPLICATIONS OF SAFETY NET-RE.ATED SUBSIDIES (1997) (examining the existing
empirical evidence that addresses the subsidy question and concluding that even if
some evidence points to a small gross subsidy, the evidence cannot be taken at face
value because the studies fail to take the costs of regulation into account).
83. See Janet Seiberg, Banks' Plea To Fed: Stop Saying We're Subsidized, AM. BANKER,
Nov. 5, 1997, at 1 (noting the banking industry's arguments); Bert Ely, Comment:
Greenspan's Deposit Insurance Subsidy Argument Is Nonsense, AM. BANKER, June 6, 1997,
at 3 (stating that deposit insurance has never cost taxpayers a cent, while loans from the
discount window must be collateralized, and the small risk of intraday overdraft risk can
be minimized by proper management; concluding there is no meaningful subsidy).
84. See Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Helfer, Ludwig Insist Deposit Insurance Doesn't Give
Banks an Unfair Advantage, AM. BANKER, Mar. 6, 1997, at 2 (recounting the testimony of
Comptroller of the Currency Eugene Ludwig and Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion Chairman Ricki Helfer asserting that the Fed's subsidy argument is incorrect
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Congress has complicated regulatory matters by grappling with vari-
ous aspects of financial reform for well over a decade. Again, some amount
of path dependency has complicated Congress' predicament: once the
Glass-Steagall product line distinctions were cast in stone, it was only a
matter of time before the various artificially created industries became
invested in the system and resisted change. Over the years, the interest
groups affected by Glass-Steagall have made so many conflicting demands
for "reform" that Congress has become paralyzed on the matter.8 5 A more
cynical perspective is that Congress has no incentive to change the law
because it knows that key players in the financial services industry will
make generous campaign contributions to influence the course of
"reform."'8 6 Indeed, some have suggested that the harsh economic realities
of the ongoing quest for re-election prevent Congress from repealing Glass-
Steagall.8 7
The behavior of Congress and regulators fits nicely with public choice
theory. Assuming governmental actors will attempt to maximize the value
of their enterprises, Congressmen will act to ensure their re-election while
attracting large campaign contributions. Regulators, on the other hand,
will try to attract new regulatees while keeping current regulatees under
their auspices.88 We have recently witnessed major changes initiated by
regulators to maximize their positions in the regulatory scheme', while Con-
gress has been silent. This may result from either the expected "regulatory
capture phenomenon" or the deadlocked Congress, created by too many
competitors for financial services legislation.
The discussion so far has not addressed the turf wars that are bound
to emerge if securities and insurance activities regulation are bundled
together in a single federal regulator. 89 The most easily observable conflict
because it does not take regulatory compliance costs into account); John D. Hawke, Jr.,
Under Secretary of the Treasury for Domestic Finance, What is the Governmental Role
in Finance, Anyway?, Panel Discussion Remarks at AALS Annual Meeting, San Francisco
(Jan. 8, 1998) (manuscript at 3, on file with author) (expressing skepticism with regard
to the existence of a net subsidy).
85. See Michael Schroeder, Why Glass-Steagall, Reviled for Decades, Just Won't Go
Away, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1998, at Al (providing a concise history of the Glass-Steagall
Act and the efforts over the years to change the law) [hereinafter Schroeder, Glass-
Steagall.
86. Id. (reporting that, in 1997, while banking reform was being seriously consid-
ered, Democratic and Republican lawmakers and their national committees received
$7.4 million from securities firms, $6.8 from insurers, and $5.5 million from banks).
87. See Howard Gleckman & Dean Foust, Why Congress Can't Afford to Shatter Glass-
Steagall, Bus. WK., Mar. 30, 1998, at 38 (commenting that financial services moderniza-
tion comes up in Congress about every two years, just in time for massive fundraising
from affected industries, and drawing the conclusion that Congress will never change
the status quo because it needs the biennial source of campaign funds).
88. See Kane, Tension, supra note 57, at 34 (noting that "managers of individual regu-
latory entities seek to maximize something broadly equivalent to the value of their enter-
prises, subject to technological, market, and statutory restraints and principal-agent
difficulties ... ").
89. The insurance industry has been fighting this battle for years and has raised this
concern in the current round of congressional deliberations. See Mattingly & Fallon,
supra note 73, at 49-50 (describing the explicit regulatory competition issue).
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to date has centered on banking industry regulation. Nevertheless, even
with a single bank regulator with authority over organizations engaging in
a wide range of activities, there will almost certainly be a clash between
regulators of the different industries. The inter-industry turf wars will inev-
itably be tied up with politically charged federalism issues and will further
complicate our interest group analysis. The issue is sufficiently complex to
limit our discussion to the rent-seeking behavior of banking regulators.
b. Canada
Unlike the U.S. regulatory scheme, plagued by ossification that reinforces
the path dependent problems discussed above, Canada's banking law is
subject to periodic systematic reconsideration. As a result, major revisions
take place about once every ten years.90 The use of "sunset provisions," 91
coupled with the different political dynamic of the parliamentary system, 92
has allowed Canada to modernize its financial system much more quickly
than the United States.
The highly concentrated banking industry in Canada93 ensures that
banking policy-makers get a clear picture of what the industry wants.
These conditions also may have fostered the development and maintenance
of a coherent and straightforward bank regulatory scheme. In Canada, a
federal banking supervising agency is the chief banking regulator. 94 The
head of the agency is appointed by the Cabinet and reports directly to the
Minister of Finance. The federal supervisor is responsible for all federally
chartered financial institutions. These include banks, insurance compa-
nies, and trust companies. The supervisor shares responsibility with the
provinces for oversight of securities firms. 9 5 The Canadian federal deposit
insurer plays a secondary role in bank oversight, while the Bank of Canada
90. See CHARLES FEEmAN, THE CANADIAN BANKING SYSTEM 1 (1998) (noting the peri-
odic reexamination of Canadian banking legislation).
91. For a discussion of sunset provisions generally, see Gouvin, Truth in Savings,
supra note 56, at 1366-67 (noting the checkered experience of sunset provisions in the
United States).
92. See John F. Chant, Canada's Economy and Financial System: Recent and Prospec-
tive Developments and the Policy Issues They Pose, in THE BANKING AND FINANcIAL STRUc-
TURE IN THE NAFTA CouwraEs AND CHILE 3, 36-7 (George M. von Furstenberg ed., 1997)
(noting the difference between the U.S. and Canadian political systems).
93. Unlike the United States, which has thousands of independent banks, Canada is
dominated by six large institutions with nationwide branching networks: the Bank of
Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, National Bank of
Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, and Toronto Dominion Bank. Collectively, these six
banks control 98.5% of the assets held by banks in Canada. See James R. Kraus, Cana-
dian Government's Fears of Concentration Seen Threat to Megadeal, AM. BANKER, Feb. 12,
1998, at 20. The banking industry will become even more concentrated if the two pend-
ing mergers between Bank of Montreal and Royal Bank of Canada and between Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce and Toronto Dominion Bank are consummated. See John
Urquhart, Canada Banks May Get Boost in Merger Plans, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 1998, at
B2. These are so-called Schedule I banks, subject to the "widely-held" rule: no person or
group may control more than ten percent of the voting stock of a Schedule I bank. See
id.; Bank Act, R.S.C., ch. B-1.01, § 370(2) (1996) (Canada) (defining "widely held").
94. See GAO OVERSIGHT STRUCTURE, supra note 67, at 57.
95. See id. at 62.
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maintains data on the financial system's condition and on individual
banks.96
The regular sunset reviews may also be a factor in minimizing the reg-
ulatory burden faced by Canadian banks. Apparently, a significant differ-
ence exists between the weight of the regulatory burden shouldered by U.S.
and Canadian banks. Although an imprecise measure, the differing vol-
ume of banking law in the two countries speaks to the difference in regula-
tory attitudes. During the early 1990s in the United States, an estimated
220,000 pages of banking law and regulation existed at just the federal
level, while in Canada the entire Bank Act and associated regulations
amounted to only 530 pages.97
Because all banks are federally chartered, there is no regulatory com-
petition between the provinces and the federal government. However, the
provincial regulators of near-banks might be tempted to engage in some
enterprise maximizing actions designed to reduce the hegemony of the
banks. On the federal level, although there is a hint of turf war between the
primary banking regulator and the bank insurance fund; the chance that it
will erupt into the type of agency rivalry found in the United States is
remote.
c. Mexico
Mexico's banking regulatory system is still evolving. Financial instability
since the peso crisis of 1994 left Mexico searching for the appropriate
model of governmental regulation. Mexico's banks and securities firms
currently are regulated by Mexico's central bank, the Ministry of Finance
and Public Credit, and the primary regulator, the National Banking and
Securities Commission (CNBV). 98 However, this scheme may change if the
banking reform package should make its way through Congress. The
states of Mexico are not active in the regulation of financial institutions.
The interest groups that are likely to influence Mexico's domestic
banking policy include its banks99 and its financial groups generally.100
96. See id. at 57.
97. See John C. Pattison, Trade in Financial Services In NAFTA: A Public Choice
Approach, in REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF FINANcIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE NAFTA
COUNTRIES AND BEYOND, supra note 68, at 145, 148-49. Another explanation for the dif-
ference is the willingness of Canada's banks to adopt voluntary guidelines to prevent the
need for legislated solutions to perceived problems. See GAO OVERSIGHT STucTR,
supra note 67, at 72 (noting the voluntary adoption by Canadian banks of consumer and
small business lending guidelines to prevent legislative solutions.).
98. See Roy A. Karaoglan & Mike Lubrano, Mexico's Banks After the December 1994
Devaluation - A Chronology of the Government's Response, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 24,
28-29 (1995) (describing the Mexican bank regulatory system).
99. At the time of NAFTA's negotiation, Mexico's banking market was dominated by
six large nationwide institutions, with seven smaller regional banks playing a secondary
role. See Carlos M. Nalda, Note, NAFTA, Foreign Investment, and The Mexican Banking
System, 26 GEo. WASH. J. Iur'L L. & EcoN. 379, 388 (1992) (noting the existence of six
national and seven multiregional banks).
100. Banks may be owned by financial groups that own other financial services firms
such as securities and insurance companies. See Ram6n Bravo H., Mexican Legal Frame-
work Applicable to Operations Involving Financial Services, 25 ST. MARY'S LJ. 1239, 1243
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In light of the economic crises since 1994, however, populist elements will
also influence banking policy. 10 1 Unlike Canada with its parliamentary
system, but similar to the United States, the process for adopting political
change in Mexico requires the executive office to deal with the Congress to
create an acceptable package of legislation.10 2 Therefore, in Mexico, inter-
est groups have incentives to seek influence not only with the President,
but also with the Congress.
President Zedillo recently proposed a broad package of reforms that
would give autonomy to banking regulators, eliminate the remaining limits
on foreign ownership of Mexican banks, reform the deposit insurance sys-
tem, dismantle the existing bank resolution agency (known as Fobaproa),
and recognize the cost of the bank bailout as public debt.10 3 Prospects for
the success of the reform package are difficult to assess, but as of this writ-
ing, the stock market is taking a dim view of the situation by heavily dis-
counting the value of Mexico's major banks.x0 4
2. International Rent-Seeking by Regulators
While banking regulators face "market pressures" in their home countries
to differing degrees, they also must contend with the more difficult prob-
lem of international regulatory competition.' 0 5 Cross-border banking reg-
ulation is always awkward because regulators in both the home and host
countries have legitimate claims to full and accurate information about
banks operating in or from their jurisdiction.10 6 Moreover, both regulators
share legitimate concerns about prevention of systemic risks brought about
(1994) (reporting that Mexican financial groups may consist of general deposit ware-
houses, financial lessors, factoring companies, limited scope financial entities, exchange
houses, bonding companies, insurance companies, brokerage firms and banks).
101. There is a widespread perception in Mexico that the rescue of the Mexican bank-
ing system benefitted a few wealthy bank owners at the expense of the rest of the coun-
try. See Roberto Salinas-Le6n, Mexico's Bank Bailout Quarrel Misses a Key Point, WALL
ST. J., June 26, 1998, at A15 (reporting the misperception); Geri Smith, A Torpedo That
Could Cripple The Economy, Bus. WK., June 22, 1998, at 62 (discussing the political
aspects of Mexico's banking crisis and reform legislation); Jonathan Friedland, Mexican
Congress Balks at Zedillo Bank Bailout, WALL ST. J.,June 3, 1998, at All (reporting public
opinion on proposed bank reforms).
102. See Jonathan Friedland, Mexican Officials Land in the Hot Seat, WALL ST. J., July
31, 1998, at A9 (noting congressional involvement in the deliberations over the pending
bank reform proposal marks a departure from 70 years of domination by the Institu-
tional Revolutionary Party, which previously presented legislation as a fait accompli).
103. See Friedland, supra note 5 (summarizing the proposal).
104. See Jonathan Friedland, Mexico Is Hit Despite Belt-Tightening, WALL ST. J., Sept.
14, 1998, at A27 (noting that Mexico's two largest financial groups were both trading at
less than one half of their book value). Part of the discount must be attributable to the
difficulty of getting timely and accurate information about what is going on in Mexico.
SeeJonathan Friedland, Mum's the Word: Mexico Isn't Free With Information, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 10, 1998, at Al (reporting on the pervasive secrecy and scarcity of reliable infor-
mation in Mexico).
105. See Kane, Tension, supra note 57, at 34 ("individual regulatory enterprises are in
competition with each other for whatever it is they maximize").
106. Apparently, at least one lesson from the LDC debt crisis is that more informa-
tion is always preferable. See William A. Lovett, Conflicts in American Banking Regula-
tion: Renewed Prudence, Retrenchment, and Struggles Over Growth Potential, 12 ANN.
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by bank failure. 107 Ideally, bank regulators in different countries would be
confident that a fellow regulator in another country applied rigorous stan-
dards when supervising an international bank's operations. But in reality,
North American regulators cannot adopt the joint regulation strategy
because they face a commitment problem.108 It is unclear whether the reg-
ulators in the three NAFTA countries have enough mutual respect to imple-
ment a successful cooperative regulation effort. For example, Canadians
resent what they consider to be the propensity of U.S. regulators to seek
extraterritorial application of U.S. law. 10 9 Simultaneously, U.S. regulators
worry that the Mexican banking regulators are not capable of supervising a
modern banking system." 0
Given the lack of harmonization and mutual respect, the NAFTA bank-
ing structure will most likely default to a system requiring subsidiaries,
rather than one permitting branching. Not surprisingly, the laws of all
three NAFTA countries permit expansion by establishment of subsidiaries,
but only the United States permits foreign banks, including Canadian and
Mexican banks,"' to expand into its market through branching." 2 The
fact that U.S. law technically permits branching, however, is somewhat illu-
sory. Foreign banks seeking to establish a presence in the United States
must comply with a labyrinth of federal regulations that treat foreign banks
less favorably than U.S. banks.113
REV. BANKING L. 443, 449 (1993) (noting that enforceable mutual disclosure laws should
exist to prevent unsustainable debt loads from getting out of hand again).
107. See generally Mico Loretan, Systemic Risk in Banking: Concept and Models, in REG-
ULATION AND SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE NAFTA COUNRmIES AND
BEYOND, supra note 68, at 38-42 (discussing the concept of systemic risk).
108. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 148-52 (discussing the problems of commitment
in strategic games).
109. SeeJordan, supra note 9, at 48 (noting that "Canadian regulators do not indulge
in the extraterritorial application of Canadian banking laws").
110. As evidence of this, consider that to have access to the U.S. market, Mexican (but
not Canadian) banks must demonstrate to the Federal Reserve that Mexican regulators
can adequately supervise the home bank. See Ross Levine, Foreign Banks, Financial
Development, and Economic Growth, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: HAMIONZA-
TION VERSUS COMPETION 224, 243 (Claude E. Barfield, ed., 1996) (noting the
requirement).
111. Branches are the most important mechanism for giving Canadian and Mexican
banks access to the U.S. market. See Michael G. Martinson, Consolidated Supervision of
Cross-Border Banking Activities: Principles and Practice in the NAFTA Context, in REGULA-
TION AND SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL INsTITUTIONS IN THE NAFTA COUNTRIES AND BEYOND,
supra note 68, at 217, 225.
112. Canada is considering legislation to permit cross-border branching. See Joseph
Weber, Just Over the Horizon: North American Banks, A Few Rule Changes Would Bring a
Wave of Cross-Border Mergers, Bus. WK., Feb. 23, 1998, at 100.
113. See Charles W. Hultman, Foreign Banks and the U.S. Regulatory Environment, 114
BANKING LJ. 452, 452 (1997) (noting that the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement
Act of 1991 resulted in less favorable treatment for foreign banks). The Foreign Bank
Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991 tightened U.S. supervision of foreign branches
and agencies operating in the United States. See generally Daniel B. Gail, JosephJ. Nor-
ton & Michael K. O'Neal, The Foreign Bank Supervision Act of 1991: Expanding the
Umbrella of "Supervisory Regulation," 26 INr'L LAW. 993, 993 (1992) (discussing
changes in foreign bank supervision brought on by the BCCI scandal). The law provides
for increased sharing of information between home and host country regulators,
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For example, U.S. regulations require foreign banks to declare whether
they intend to engage in wholesale or retail banking through their
branches. If they plan to engage in retail banking and take deposits of less
than $100,000, then the U.S. operation must be organized as an insured
subsidiary rather than as a branch of the foreign bank.1 14 The comprehen-
sive supervision and information requirements of the law have dampened
foreign interest in the U.S. banking market."l 5 The increasingly difficult
process of branching into the United States may explain the NAFTA provi-
sion that imposes a freeze on any further restrictions on cross-border
banking. 16
Canadian regulators fare no better on the international turf protection
front. Like their U.S. counterparts, Canadian regulators are not willing to
give up their regulatory power without a fight. For example, it was under-
stood during the negotiation of both the FTA and NAFTA that Canada
opposed cross-border branching. This was due, in part, to Canadian bank-
ing regulators' desire for a Canadian bank that they could regulate. 1 7 We
should expect Mexican regulators to behave like their U.S. and Canadian
counterparts, especially in light of the fact that Mexico does not permit
foreign branching and explicitly negotiated for bank ownership protections
in NAFTA. 118
The turf war mentality is entirely consistent with a public choice view
of the world, which sees regulators as managers who seek to maximize the
requires deposit insurance for all deposits under $100,000, requires the Federal Reserve
to approve all applications for any branch, agency or representative office, and permits
the Federal Reserve to examine and close all such international banking facilities. Id. at
993-94.
114. 12 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994); see Scott, supra note 35 (discussing the change from
previous policy).
115. See Hultman, supra note 113, at 453 (commenting that comprehensive supervi-
sion and extensive information requirements have contributed to waning foreign interest
in the U.S. banking market).
116. See NAFTA, supra note 8, at art. 1404(1), 32 I.L.M. at 658.
117. SeeJordan, supra note 9, at 48 (voicing the opinion that the Canadian trade nego-
tiators did not yield to the pressures to permit U.S. branches because "Canadian regula-
tors... wished to ensure that there was a Canadian entity to be regulated.").
118. When foreign banking was first permitted in 1994, foreign subsidiaries' aggre-
gate capital share of the Mexican domestic market was limited to eight percent. The
Mexican plan called for an increasingly liberal scheme of foreign ownership over a six
year transition period until the last year if the transition foreign banks could control an
aggregate of 15% of the capital in the commercial banking market. NAFTA, supra note
8, at Annex VII(B)(9), 32 I.L.M. at 774. At the end of the transition period the aggregate
capital limits are supposed to lapse, subject only to Mexico's reserved right to impose
additional limitations on banking competition if foreign banks control 25% of the Mexi-
can banking market beforeJanuary 1, 2004. See Bravo, supra note 100, at 1249-51 (set-
ting out the restrictions on foreign ownership of various Mexican financial institutions).
In the years since negotiating NAFTA, Mexico has had to reconsider the wisdom of for-
eign ownership requirements, and make adjustments in the foreign ownership scheme
to attract needed capital to the Mexican banking system. See Jonathan Friedland, Mex-
ico's Big Banks Can't Lure Investors, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1998, at A13; Michael
Tangeman, Caps Off to Foreign Investment, LATIN FIN., May 1998, at 40 (summarizing the
changes in foreign bank ownership rules since NAFTA's enactment).
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value of their enterprises. 1 9 Because branches are primarily regulated by
the bank's home country regulator rather than the host country regulator,
a scheme of cross-border branching will necessarily require paring down
the current regulatory load of the host country regulators who are primar-
ily responsible for the banking subsidiaries that operate within their terri-
tory.120 Banking regulators who have a vested interest in the current
system will not give up their authority willingly. Putting the public choice
perspective aside, the legitimate public policy problems facing banking reg-
ulators (such as protecting bank customers and investors from asymmetric
information problems, guarding against systemic failure, and working
toward fair trade) indicate that regulators should retain the right to fashion
their own domestic regulatory scheme. 1 2 '
On the other hand, there is a dynamic tension between the regulators
and the regulated that causes regulators to be sensitive to industry con-
cerns. Corporate structure allows banking organizations some leeway in
selecting their regulators. Since the costs of regulation can be quite high,
banking firms often prefer to choose the regulator that will cover them.
Because regulators act to increase their jurisdiction and different countries
govern different aspects of international banking organizations, regulators
may act as catalysts to alter banking regulation to attract more regulatees to
their jurisdiction. This competition may lead to better and more efficient
regulation, or it could instead turn into a "race to the bottom." By
attracting firms from other countries, international regulators can increase
their market share, their power, and the value of their regulatory
enterprise. 122
In the NAFTA countries, regulatory competition seems to favor Can-
ada and Mexico over the United States. Canada is probably best positioned
because of its relatively light regulatory load. Mexico's banking regulation,
although more liberal in many respects than U.S. law, still suffers from the
stigma of being perceived as unstable. Banks in Canada and Mexico, how-
ever, are freer to engage in a broader range of activities over a wider geo-
graphic area than those chartered in the United States. In light of this, U.S.
119. See Kane, Tension, supra note 57, at 34 (describing the need of regulators to
maximize the value of their enterprise within the confines of what he calls the
"microeconomic analysis of financial regulation" that is consistent with the public
choice view).
120. Subsidiaries are regulated primarily in the jurisdiction in which they are
chartered. The regulation of branches is more complicated: for prudential matters, such
as capital levels and management competence, the home country regulator has priority,
but for market matters, the host country regulates. See Martinson, supra note 111, at
217 (applying general concepts of home and host country regulation to the NAFTA
situation).
121. See Jean Dermine, International Trade in Banking, in INRNA-roNAL FINANCIAL
MARKTs: HARMONIZATION VERSus COMPEnTION, supra note 110, at 49, 70-71 (reaching
the conclusion that some autonomy in domestic regulation is necessary to address
problems of asymmetric information, systemic failure and fair trade problems, but going
on to consider whether the best approach in the international context should be national
treatment or reciprocity).
122. See Kane, Tension, supra note 57, at 35-36 (noting that banking regulators must
be aware of competition from banking regulators in other countries).
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regulators may recognize their competitive disadvantage and delay cross
border branching until the U.S. regulatory scheme can be made more com-
patible with international norms.
Of course, the regulators may recognize that they are engaged in a
game that could maximize joint pay-offs if they co-operate with each
other.' 23 Although NAFTA itself does not require the signatory countries
to take any meaningful steps toward harmonization of their respective
domestic laws regulating financial services, 124 when viewed through a
public choice lens, harmonization may be acceptable to regulators. While
acting to maximize the values of their respective regulatory enterprises,
North American bank regulators could attempt to standardize their regula-
tion by forming a cartel. Harmonization would reduce much of the regula-
tory competition that erodes regulators' market share. By standardizing
the regulatory product, the regulators could control the supply of regula-
tion and protect the status quo to lock in their respective positions.1 25 Of
course, cartels can be unstable. Also, it would be difficult for regulators to
craft an agreement that could not be broken by an innovative regulatory
scheme in one country designed to increase the power and prestige of that
country's regulator. 126
Even without the motivation to form a cartel, NAFTA banking regula-
tors may find themselves pushed in the direction of increased harmoniza-
tion. One important reason for increased harmonization is that North
America is generally characterized by "regulatory emulation."'1 27 That is,
Canada and Mexico tend to change their policies to be at least as liberal as
the United States to make sure that they have not erected obstacles to the
flow of international resources that would favor investment in the United
States over either Canada or Mexico. 128
The NAFTA countries also face pressure to liberalize trade and gain
access to non-NAFTA markets. 129 Indeed the regional trade blocks may
123. For a discussion of cooperative non-zero sum games, see R. DUNCAN LUCE AND
HowARD RAiFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY 88-96 (1957)
(providing mathematical discussion and examples).
124. See Trachtman, supra note 24, at 94 (noting that NAFTA does not require finan-
cial regulation harmonization).
125. See Kane, Tension, supra note 57, at 34 (discussing the concept of regulatory
cartels).
126. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 454-60 (4th ed.
1995) (describing the factors affecting the stability of cartels).
127. See Cockfield, supra note 65, at 45-46 (describing the idea of regulatory emula-
tion in North America in the tax context).
128. Id. This may explain why the Task Force on the Future of the Canadian Finan-
cial Services Sector has proposed that Canada permit foreign bank branching for pur-
poses of engaging in wholesale banking but continue to require a Canadian subsidiary
in order to engage in retail banking. See TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF THE CANADIAN
FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR, CHANGE, CHALLENGE, OPPORTUNITY: REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE 195 (Sept., 1998). This is approach to foreign banking is notably similar to the
U.S. approach.
129. For example, Canada (1996) and Mexico (1991) have already negotiated free
trade agreements with Chile. See George M. von Furstenberg, Preface to THE BANKING
AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE IN THE NAFTA COUNTIES AND CHILE, supra note 92, at xiii
Vol. 32
1998 Banking in North America
end up in competition with each other, which in turn could lead to signifi-
cant reductions in trade barriers.130 As trade in financial services plays an
increasingly important role in these trade pacts, the obstacles to unfettered
cross-border activity should disappear.
Even if none of the reasons for harmonization discussed above come
to pass, the North American banking industry inevitably will find itself
subject to an increasing number of international agreements affecting the
trade of services and the regulation of banking in particular.' 31 Although
multinational trade agreements covering industries as complicated as the
financial services industry take a long time to evolve, banking regulators
have begun a movement toward greater cooperation.132
The public choice perspective predicts the mere existence of cross-bor-
der commerce, combined with increased contact between policy-makers
and business people, will hopefully lead to the adoption of the "best" poli-
cies.133 Indeed, in the securities area, U.S. and Canadian regulators have
already achieved a considerable degree of harmonization of federal, state,
and provincial securities regulation.134
Conversely, given the effects of path dependence and the disparate
initial conditions of the NAFTA nations, even if liberalization and competi-
tion create some pressure for the convergence of the banking regulatory
scheme in the three countries, that convergence is unlikely to ever be com-
plete. As Lucian Bebchuk and Mark Roe have argued, in a context of inter-
national corporate governance structures where key decision makers also
receive rent and can block change, the existing system will tend to
persist.13 5
(noting the existence of free trade agreements between Canada and Chile and Mexico
and Chile).
130. One way to look at NAFTA is as a competitive response by the North American
countries to the increased unification of the European Union.
131. For example, the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") has already
begun to have some effect on the international provision of banking services. See gener-
ally, Simser, supra note 63 (describing the structure of the GATS and its implications for
trade in financial services).
132. SeeJosephJ. Norton, Trends in International Bank Supervision and the Basle Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision, 48 CONS. FIN. L.Q. 415 (1995) (summarizing some of the
issues confronting the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision).
133. See Zamora, Harmonization, supra note 24 (arguing that increased cross-border
contact between businesspeople, bureaucrats, lawyers, academics and others will inevi-
tably lead to an exchange of ideas and accommodation in each of the three countries of
the cultural differences of the others); and Aman, supra note 24 (arguing that global
political and economic forces push national policies towards various forms of deregula-
tion and privatization).
134. See Jordan, supra note 9, at 53 (noting that the Canadian scheme of securities
regulation is modeled on the U.S. scheme and that regulators have achieved considera-
ble integration).
135. See Lucian Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate
Ownership and Governance, in CoRPoATE GovENAN'cE TODAY 575, 585-96 (1998)
(describing the view that difference in corporate governance might persist provided that
the costs of a Coasian bargain are not trivial); but see J. Mark Ramseyer, Are Corporate
Governance Systems Converging?, in ComoRPATE GOVRNANcE TODAY, supra, at 537 (argu-
ing that systems of successful firms are shaped by economic logic and, over time, differ-
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B. Rent-Seeking Behavior of Financial Services Industry Interests
Of course, in addition to regulators, participants in the financial services
industry will try to influence the actions of trade negotiators. There can be
little doubt that the banking, securities, and insurance industries in
NAFTA countries have the necessary resources to translate their economic
power into political action when desired.
1. United States
The United States has a highly fragmented financial services industry.
Identifiable industry segments include money center banks, regional
banks, community banks, investment banks, asset-based lenders, con-
sumer finance firms, thrifts, credit unions, insurance companies, mutual
funds, and securities brokers, among others. Each of these participants
has its own perspective on optimal financial services modernization.
Thus, to date, no one group or coalition of groups has mobilized enough
political support to change the structure of the financial services industry
in the United States.136 In addition, the political process relating to finan-
cial services regulation is complex and fragmented, such that altering
financial services policy in the United States requires lobbying in the legis-
lative, executive, and administrative branches of government at both the
state and federal levels. While it is easy to observe rent-seeking behavior
by both industry participants and various political actors, rarely does the
critical mass of industry interest align with the critical mass of political
weight, enabling change in the regulatory scheme.
Consequently, the current configuration of U.S. banking regulation
seems likely to persist, in part because the current regulations produce
winners and losers, and while the benefits to the winners tend to be con-
centrated, the costs to the losers tend to be diffuse. 13 7 The stakes for the
losers (such as individual consumers of financial services who pay margin-
ally higher prices than they might under a different regulatory scheme) will
never coalesce into an effective counterweight to the loot for the winners.
Given the incentives created by our own regulatory scheme for the existing
set of winners and losers in our financial system, it seems unlikely that the
United States will lead the charge to bring cross-border branching to the
NAFTA countries.
One group of winners under the current scheme is the banking indus-
try. U.S. bankers will oppose change in cross-border banking because they
benefit from the current structure that permits U.S. access to Mexico or
ent gystems will tend to converge). See also Lawrence J. White, Competition Versus
Harmonization - An Overview of International Regulation of Financial Services, in INTER-
NATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: HARMONIZATION VERSUS COMPETITION, supra note 110, at 5
(providing an overview of the competition versus harmonization debate).
136. See Schroeder, Glass-Steagall, supra note 85 (providing a concise political history
of Glass-Steagall reform).
137. See Randall S. Kroszner, The Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regula-
tion in the United States, in THE BANING AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURiE IN THE NAFTA COUN-
TiEs AND CHILE, supra note 92, at 201, 202 (noting the disparity in costs and benefits of
preferential regulation).
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Canada through subsidiaries while permitting access to the United States
through highly regulated branches. Under this scheme, the United States
has better access to both Canada and Mexico than the rest of the world's
major banking powers, while Canada and Mexico have access to the United
States on essentially the same terms as every other country. The United
States can honestly state that it permits branching already and maintain
that it will not liberalize its branching regime until Mexico and Canada
permit true branching.
Although U.S. law permits nationwide branching for banks located in
the United States, U.S. banks will be reluctant to permit Canadian and
Mexican banks the right to unfettered branching from their home offices,
regardless of the sentiment contained in NAFTA Section 1403. Even
though nationwide branching is now possible, only two mega-mergers,
announced earlier this year, have made coast-to-coast branching a real-
ity.138 U.S. banks need time to establish their own nationwide branching
systems and will not permit U.S. trade representatives to allow Canadian
and Mexican banks to get in on the ground floor of U.S. nationwide
branching. On their home territories, both Mexican and Canadian banks
have long established branched national networks that give them a big
head start on any U.S. attempts to enter their respective markets.
In addition, strong evidence suggests that foreign banks in the United
States are less profitable than their U.S. competitors. 139 Because a branch
network should be cheaper and thus more profitable than a subsidiary net-
work, permitting true branches will only serve to make foreign banks more
competitive in the United States. The banking lobby will use its political
clout to prevent that from occurring. On the other hand, branching will
permit U.S. banks to access the Canadian and Mexican markets more effi-
ciently. However, the big U.S. banks have already incurred the expense
and inconvenience of establishing Mexican subsidiaries 140 and can be
expected to oppose unfettered branching which would permit late-comers
to branch into Mexico at a lower cost. As for Canada, the banking market
there is already saturated, and free branching would not make the profit
picture there much brighter.
138. See Steven Lipin & Gordon Fairclough, Mergers of NationsBank, BankAmerica
and Bane One, First Chicago Unveiled, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1998, at A3 (discussing two
banking mergers that if approved will result in two organizations with retail locations
that literally reach from coast to coast). Earlier attempts to provide "coast-to-coast bank-
ing have not been successful. See Matt Murray, KeyCorp Fails to Prove It Can Unlock
Promise of a Merger of Equals, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1998, at Al (describing the failure of
KeyCorp to achieve success on its northern tier strategy).
139. See Hultman, supra note 113, at 453 (providing statistics showing that the aver-
age return on assets of foreign banks operating in the United States is significantly lower
than that of U.S. banks generally and lower than a cohort group of internationally active
U.S. banks); SCOTT & WEaLONS, supra note 22, at 138 (noting that foreign banks appear
to be less efficient and more dependent on wholesale funding, thereby making their cost
of funds higher).
140. See Palace, supra note 45, at 162 (describing the flurry of application approved
by U.S. banking organizations to engage in a range of activities in Mexico).
Cornell International Law Journal
2. Canada
Canada's banking market is not very hospitable to foreign entrants, and its
banks still enjoy some protectionist measures. 14 1 In addition, because the
Canadian market is already overbanked, the major Canadian banks have
come to recognize that the opportunities for growth are outside Canada. 142
While NAFTA's provisions allow U.S. and Mexican banks slightly easier
access to a mature market where well-established firms have long customer
relationships and efficient operations, 143 foreign entrants are largely left to
exploit niche businesses. 144
Foreign financial service providers have found it very difficult to estab-
lish profitable operations in Canada.14 5 Although many U.S. banks main-
tain a presence in Canada, it is clear that they will never be major players
there.14 6 Therefore, Canadian banking interests probably do not care
whether NAFTA member countries are permitted to branch into Canada, as
long as the other markets, especially Mexico, are opened to Canadian
banks in return.
The Canadian banking industry is able to easily communicate its
interests to the Canadian trade representative since the industry is concen-
trated and therefore can speak with one voice. In addition, the Canadian
parliamentary form of government means the industry needs only to seek
rents from the party in power to implement the policy it desires.14 7 These
facts, coupled with the national policy of reviewing the banking laws every
five years or so, ensure that Canada will respond quickly to the political
demands of its financial services industry. 14 8
141. As a practical matter, the Schedule I banks will never be taken over by foreign
interests as long as the "widely held" rule remains in place. See Bank Act, R.S.C. ch. B-
1.01 § 370(2) (1996) (Canada) (defining "widely held"). The Task Force's proposals for
modifying the widely held rule fall far short of eliminating it. See TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 128, at 200-01 (describing proposed modifications to the widely held rule).
142. See Weber, supra note 112 (noting that Canadian banks are looking south for
growth).
143. See James R. Kraus, Canada Plan Would Permit Cross-Border Branches, Am.
BANKER, May 22, 1997, at 22 (quoting Canadian banking experts who remark that Can-
ada has a technology and cost efficiency edge on U.S. banks resulting in lower spreads
and the need for high volume to cover costs).
144. See CHARLES FREEDm'A & CLYDE GOODLET, THE FINANCIAL SERvICEs SECTOR: PAST
CHANGES AND FuTuRE PROSPECTS 25 (Mar. 1998) (noting that the dominant position of
Canada's banks will be challenged by "global" banks and niche players).
145. See WHITE, supra note 9, at 10 (noting that foreign banks in Canada have failed to
achieve rates of return on equity that even equal the return available from Canadian
treasury bills).
146. Id. (noting that Canada has been a "tough nut to crack" for U.S. banks and point-
ing out that in the seventeen years since U.S. banks have been permitted in Canada they
have a very limited presence, with Citicorp, the largest, having merely $4.8 billion in
assets, which amounts to about one half of one percent of total Canadian banking
assets).
147. See Chant, supra note 92, at 36-7 (noting the difference between the U.S. and
Canadian political systems).
148. As the recent Report of the Task Force demonstrates, however, the banking
industry is not the only rent-seeking group that is accommodated through the review
process. The report contains payoffs for consumer groups, regulators and other service
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Given the state of the Canadian political marketplace, it comes as no
surprise that the Task Force on the Future of the Canadian Financial Serv-
ices Sector has recommended that Canada permit foreign banks to branch
into Canada to engage in wholesale banking, but to continue to require a
Canadian subsidiary to engage in retail banking.149 By making this
change, Canada responds to international pressure to permit branching,
but does so within the restrictive U.S. model, so that neither the banking
industry nor the Canadian regulators give up very much by way of this
modest change. Additionally, as expected, the Task Force did not recom-
mend the elimination of the "widely held" rule, but rather only suggested
modifications to it.1 5 0 The modest modifications seem designed to guar-
antee that the largest Canadian banks will continue to be Canadian owned.
3. Mexico
Mexico represents a very attractive market for U.S. and Canadian banks,1
51
despite Mexican banks' competitive edge because of their extensive branch
networks (which gives them a diverse geographic and customer base), and
their expertise on the Mexican market, legal system, and political institu-
tions.152 Whereas the U.S. and Canadian markets are well supplied with
banking services, Mexico is dramatically undersupplied.153 The average
interest rate on a Mexican loan is thirty-two percent.154 Consequently,
providers such as insurance companies and credit unions. See TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 128.
149. See id. at 195 (noting that foreign banks that want to attract deposits of less than
$150,000 (Canadian) would have to establish a Canadian subsidiary).
150. See id. at 200-01 (noting that for most institutions no party may own 10% of any
class of shares except upon prior approval of the Minister of Finance, while ownership
restriction on banks of over $5 billion are even more restrictive).
151. See Zamora, Comments, supra note 10, at 78 (noting attractiveness of Mexican
banking market).
152. See Thomas Heather, Comments on Financial Services, Other Services, and Tempo-
rary Entry Rules, 1 U.S.-Max. LJ. 73, 75 (1993) (listing advantages held by Mexican
firms in the post-NAFTA Mexican banking market); MacAllister supra note 26, at 303-04
(noting many potential competitive advantages for Mexican banks in the retail and com-
mercial banking markets, including the ability of customers of Mexican banks to pay
their utility bills at the bank).
153. SeeJordan, supra note 9, at 52, n.43 (noting that at the time of NAFTA's negotia-
tion only eight percent of Mexicans had a checking account and there were an average of
18,500 people per banking branch in Mexico as opposed to approximately 2,000 people
per branch in the United States and Canada); see also WiTE, supra note 9, at 16 (giving
the branching information as 19,000 people per branch in Mexico versus 2,000 people
per branch in the United States and Canada); and MacAllister, supra note 26, at 297
(noting that Mexico is a large, untapped market).
154. See Bronwen Davis, Comment, Mexico's Commercial Banking Industry: Can Mex-
ico's Recently Privatized Banks Compete With the United States Banking Industry After
Enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement?, 10 ARiz. J. oF IN'L & CoNI'. L.
77, 101 (1993) (noting the high Mexican interest rate compared to similar U.S. loans).
Nominal Mexican interest rates fluctuate between 30% and 40%, more than double the
inflation rate of 13%. Although such rates may reflect a market where demand for bank-
ing exceeds the supply, the high rates may also merely reflect risk premiums that com-
pensate lenders against the default risk. See Salinas-Le6n, supra note 101 (noting the
perverse incentives created by Mexico's deposit insurance and bankruptcy laws that
have the effect of increasing the risk of default).
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U.S. banks have been eyeing the potential of the Mexican banking market
for some time.155
The easiest way for U.S. and Canadian banks to gain access to the
Mexican market would be for NAFTA to provide unfettered, routine cross-
border branching. But cross-border banking may be prevented because of
events that occurred after the enactment of NAFTA. Mexico's banking sys-
tem is in dire need of massive amounts of new capital. Allowing U.S. and
Canadian branching will defeat efforts to find foreign investors for Mex-
ico's ailing banks. Industry interests and political operators know that
Mexico does not really have the option of allowing branching at this time.
On top of that, some members of Congress are suspicious of foreign
involvement in banking and would want to maintain barriers to foreign
entry. In addition, branching will be only a minor issue for the U.S. and
Canadian banks already present in Mexico. The large U.S. and Canadian
banks have already expanded into Mexico through the subsidiary device,
and branching from home will not be a significant advantage to them. 156
Mexican negotiators may be willing to make some concessions on
branching to obtain access to the U.S. banking market. Mexican banks
may desire to provide banking services to the substantial Hispanic popula-
tions in the southern tier of the United States.' 57 U.S. banking interests
are likely to oppose these prospects with vigor.158 Nevertheless, Mexican
banks with existing subsidiaries in the southwestern United States159
would also probably prefer to service that market through a branch net-
work. Therefore, depending on how attractive Mexican banks find the U.S.
market, Mexican negotiators may be willing to make some concessions on
branching.
155. See Karen Epper, Crowded at Home, U.S. Firms Look to Mexico, Am. BANKER, Jan.
19, 1994, at 2. With rates of return on equity in Mexican banks at 27%, compared to
13% for U.S. banks and 10% for Canadian banks, the Mexican banking industry seems
to show signs of weak competition. See WHiTE, supra note 9, at 16 (providing return on
equity figures).
156. See Clark, supra note 6 (describing Bank of Montreal's plan to be the first true
North American bank through its operations in Canada, Mexico and the United States);
James R. Kraus, Commercia Near Decision on Opening Bank in Canada, Am. BANKER, July
2, 1997, at 5 (describing Commercia's North American strategy); Fluckiger, supra note
7, at 82 (describing the Mexican operations of Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of Montreal,
Wells Fargo, and NationsBank); and Weber, supra note 112 (noting that Canadian bank-
ers are looking south for growth).
157. See Davis, supra note 154, at 99 (noting that Mexican banks are especially inter-
ested in cultivating the southwestern border region of the United States); but see Andrea
Gerlini, In This Texas Town, Their Favorite Bank is Mattress Savings, WALL ST.J., Oct. 31,
1996, at Al (noting market research showing that Hispanics are reluctant to use banking
services).
158. Loans made in Mexico frequently are denominated in US dollars. U.S. banks
know this and will be very cautious about providing easy branching to Mexican banks
and thereby permitting access to low cost funds through a deposit gathering network.
159. See Cogan, supra note 7, at 770 (noting the presence of Mexican banking subsidi-
aries in the United States since 1978).
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4. International Aspects
In addition to the country specific matters discussed above, several consid-
erations affecting industry's desire for branching (or lack thereof) cut
across national borders. The first major issue is the exploitation of govern-
ment safety subsidies bestowed on banks in the NAFTA countries.
a. Exploiting the Safety Net Subsidy
While the debate over the existence and extent of the safety net subsidy in
the context of domestic banking policy drags on,160 the issue has a differ-
ent dimension in the international context. If U.S. banks receive a safety
net subsidy but "firewalls" make it difficult to transfer the benefit of the
subsidy upstream to the holding company, then banks should clamor for
cross-border branching in order to exploit the subsidy from within the
bank itself. Intuitively, U.S. bankers would, if such a subsidy exists, insist
on engaging in cross-border branching as soon as possible so that U.S.
banks could exploit the subsidy in our neighboring countries.
But in the international setting, such an argument is off the mark
because all important banking countries bestow a safety net through some
kind of systemic default guarantee that acts to protect depositors and subsi-
dize banks.16 1 The mere existence of such a subsidy does'not explain one
country's competitive success in the banking market vis-a-vis banks from
other countries. Rather, success is more likely determined by a combina-
tion of "comparative advantage, the fundamentals of each economy, 162 and
governmental support in the form of safety net policies." 163 So while the
safety net subsidy is part of the picture, it is only part. On the interna-
tional level, the important question to ask is not "does a subsidy exist," but
rather "how big is one subsidy compared to the subsidies provided by the
other countries?"
Canada's banks enjoy safety-net benefits from their deposit insurance
system and central bank similar to the benefits bestowed upon U.S. banks
by the FDIC and the Federal Reserve.' 64 One might surmise from the dif-
ference in the regulatory burden between the United States and Canada,
and the much lower failure rate of Canadian banks, that the net subsidy to
160. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
161. See Colombatto & Macey, supra note 52, at 941.
162. On the point of the strength and stability of the domestic economies in each
country, the United States is clearly head and shoulders above its two partners. The
U.S. economy is mature, diverse and immense. Mexico's and Canada's economies are
each less than 10% the size of the U.S. economy, and both countries are also both mak-
ing the transition from being primarily natural resources based economies to being cen-
tered more on manufacturing and services. A strong U.S. economy means strong U.S.
banks, which should translate into a comparative advantage.
163. HAL S. SCOTT & NVAHARA SHINSAKU, IN SEARCH OF A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD: THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BASLE CAPITAL ACCORD IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 1 (1994).
164. See Reforms Needed for Financial Services to Flourish Says CBA, CANADA Nmv-
sWiRE, Oct. 29, 1997 (reporting on a Canadian Bankers Association report that urges
reevaluation of the "special privileges" accorded to Canadian banks, such as deposit
insurance, liquidity support from the Bank of Canada, and access to the payment
system).
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Canadian banks exceeds the U.S. subsidy. Mexico's commitment to its
banking system, although recently tested by the peso crisis, probably does
not translate into a sizeable subsidy for Mexican banks (especially with the
memory of nationalization still relatively fresh in the collective conscious-
ness of the industry). In sum, Canada would appear to have the edge on
the size of safety net subsidy and would therefore desire to branch directly
across national borders to capitalize on that subsidy. U.S. and Mexican
banks would therefore be expected to resist.
b. Realizing Economies of Scope
Financial services firms have been combining over the past few years in an
effort to offer customers a wide range of products and services. 165 The
firms theorize that joint production of a wide range of products and serv-
ices will result in an economy of scope.166 An economy of scope occurs
when one firm can more cheaply produce two products together than any
two separate firms can produce the separate products independently.1 67
Oddly, this strategy has disappointed financial service firms in the past.168
Even with the recent liberalization of bank powers, the artificial compart-
mentalization of the U.S. financial services market effectively prevents
banking organizations from realizing meaningful economies of scope.
Studies examining the issue have found that there is no consistent evi-
dence of global economies of scope in banking, although there is some
evidence of product specific economies of scope in production. 169 The
lack of academic literature supporting the existence of economies of scope
in banking has been offered as an argument against breaking down the
artificial barriers that define U.S. commercial banking. 170 The weakness
of the literature, however, is that it focuses on the U.S. banking industry as
it currently exists. Eliminating the barriers between commercial and
investment banking would make the production of securities underwriting,
165. See, e.g., With Rules Eased, Banks Flock to Securities Underwriting, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 18, 1997, at 1 (noting the acquisition of securities firms by large banks and the
strategic changes in regional banks' plans.).
166. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 126, at 220-23 (discussing economies of
scope).
167. See LorettaJ. Mester, Efficient Production of Financial Services: Scale and Scope of
Economies, FED. RESERvE BANK OF PHiLA. Bus. Ray., Jan./Feb. 1987, at 15, 16.
168. See Steve Swartz & Steve Weiner, Many Firms Back Off From Offering Arrays of
Financial Services, WAL ST. J., Nov. 12, 1986, at A29 (discussing the disappointing
results of full service financial service providers such as Merrill Lynch, American
Express, and Sears Roebuck).
169. SeeJeffery A. Clark, Economies of Scale and Scope at Depositary Financial Institu-
tions: A Review of the Literature, 73 FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANsAs Crry EcoN. Rav., Sept./
Oct. 1988, at 26 (reviewing the literature and finding little evidence of meaningful over-
all economies of scope, but finding support for the idea that cost complementarity may
exist for some pairs of products); see also William Curt Hunter and Stephen G. Timme,
Does Multi-product Production in Large Banks Reduce Costs?, 74 EcoN. REv. FED. RESERVE
BANK OF ATLANTA, May/June 1989, at 2 (finding that multiproduct production does.not
necessarily result in lower costs of production).
170. See Leach Circulates GAO Study Criticizing Mixing of Banking and Commerce, 16
BANKING POL'Y REP. 10, 12 (1997) (stating "the virtually unanimous finding in the litera-
ture is that economies of scope are insignificant in banking").
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banking, insurance and other financial services much easier. One would
be able to take advantage of combined facilities, personnel, knowledge,
information, brand name, and customer base, all within one firm rather
than dealing with separate firms.171 Many observers of the banking busi-
ness believe economies of scope would be significant.172 Therefore, the
ability of U.S. banks to achieve meaningful economies of scope likely
depends on repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. This, in turn, will be a mul-
tifaceted political question. Glass-Steagall has essentially provided the U.S.
securities industry with a generous subsidy, and the industry is unlikely to
give up the advantages of the law without a fight. 173
To the extent U.S. banks are unable to exploit economies of scope, they
are at a competitive disadvantage with respect to their Canadian and Mexi-
can competitors. Canada once imposed restrictions along product lines
similar to Glass-Steagall, but did away with most of those restrictions in the
1987 and 1992 banking act revisions. 174 At the anecdotal level, because
Canada has permitted banks to acquire securities dealers as subsidiaries,
all of the major Canadian securities dealers are now owned by banks.175
Even though cause and effect are difficult to prove, all three U.S. brokerage
firms with a presence in Canada in 1987 had withdrawn from the market
by 1994.176 Mexico, like Canada, permits common ownership of securi-
ties firms and banks, along with other financial services providers. Glass-
Steagall is currently acting as a major non-tariff barrier to trade to keep the
North American competitors from realizing economies of scope from their
integrated financial services businesses. Banks in the United States are
171. See Bernard Shull & Lawrence J. White, The Right Corporate Structure for
Expended Bank Activities, 115 BANNG L.J. 446, 464 (1998) (describing potential econo-
mies of scope).
172. See David M. Eaton, The Commercial Banking-Related Activities of Investment
Banks and Other Nonbanks, 44 EMORY LJ. 1187, 1206 n.127 (1995) (citing ROBERT E.
LITAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKs Do? 60 (1987) for the proposition that combining financial
products will result in economies of scope); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany,
Japan and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REv. 73, 110 (1995) (noting economies of scope
between banks and their securities affiliates); Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D. Olive,
The Ongoing Process of International Bank Regulatory and Supervisory Convergence: A
New Regulatory-Market "Partnership," 16 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 227, 276 n.170 (1997)
(stating that economies of scope could arise by combining commercial and investment
banking because information gathering is an important function of both businesses);
and George A. Walker, The Law of Financial Conglomerates: The Next Generation, 30
INT'L LAW. 57, 63 (1996) (noting that one advantage of conglomeration is the presence
of economies of scope).
173. See Donna L. Lance, Note, Can the Glass-Steagall Act be Justified Under the Global
Free Trade Market Policies of the NAFTA?, 34 WASHBURN LJ. 297, 298 (1995) (observing
that Glass-Steagall has shielded the U.S. securities industry from domestic competition
from commercial banks and thereby bestowed a subsidy to the securities industry).
174. See Edward P. Neufeld & Harry Hassanwalia, Challenges for the Further Restruc-
turing of the Financial Services Industry in Canada, in THE BANKING AND FINANCIAL STRUc-
TURE IN THE NAFTA CouNTRIEs AND CHILE, supra note 92, at 45, 57-59 (describing the
rise and fall of the "four pillars" of the Canadian financial services industry - banking,
insurance, trust and investment activities).
175. See WHITE, supra note 9, at 10.
176. Id.
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likely to cling to this current scenario until they can compete with Cana-
dian and Mexican firms on an equal footing.
c. Realizing Economies of Scale
When a firm can increase its level of output and decrease the average cost
of production, economies of scale exist, since it costs proportionately less
to produce at a larger scale. 177 Although researchers have long studied the
existence of economies of scale in the banking industry, results of those
studies do not paint a clear picture. 178 Studies in the 1970s and 1980s
evaluating the existence of overall economies of scale in the banking indus-
try almost unanimously concluded that economies of scale either did not
exist or were substantially exhausted by the time banks reached the asset
size range of $25 million to $100 million.179 However, there may have
been some methodological problems with those studies. 180 Other studies
prepared during the period have tended to show that some product-specific
economies of scale do exist.181 Intuitively, it seems obvious that econo-
mies of scale, at least on the product-specific level, should exist in banking.
177. See viester, supra note 167.
178. The earliest empirical studies of economies of scale tended to show that scale
economies in banking were relatively unimportant. See Richard W. Nelson, Economies of
Scale v. Regulation as Determinants of U.S. Banking Structure, in PROCEEDINGS OF A CON-
FERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION 462 (1983). Studies during the 1960's,
however, found significant economies of scale in the banking industry. See FREDERICK
W. BELL & NEIL B. MURPHY, ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN COMMERCIAL BANKING 8-9 (1967)
(analyzing data obtained in 1965 and showing that unit costs declined significantly as
banks expanded operations); GeorgeJ. Benston Economies of Scale and Marginal Costs in
Banking Operations 2 NAT'L BANKING REv. 507, 541 (June 1965) (using data from the
early 1960s, concluded that economies of scale were observed in each of several differ-
ent banking services).
179. See Clark, supra note 169, at 26 (reviewing 13 empirical studies and finding that,
overall, economies of scale appear to exist only at low levels of output, while disecono-
mies of scale appear at large output levels); George J. Benston et al., Economies of Scale
and Scope in Banking, in PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETI-
TION, supra note 178, at 432, 452 (concluding that there are no overall scales of economy
below low output levels); see also A. Sinan Cebenoyan, Multi-Product Cost Functions and
Scale Economies in Banking, 23 FIN. REv. 499 (Nov. 1988); Thomas Gilligan & Michael
Smirlock, An Empirical Study ofJoint Production and Scale Economies in Commercial Bank-
ing, 8 J. BANKING & FIN. 67-77 (1984) (finding scale economies in small banks, but
diseconomies in large banks).
180. The studies are subject to the following criticisms: a) they all relied on the
translog cost function which may contain deficiencies that cause it to invariably find a
U-shaped cost curve. SeeJames E. McNulty, Economies of Scale: Discussion, in PROCEED-
INGS OF A CONFERENCE ON BANK STRucTuRE AND COMPETITION, supra note 178, at 456,
457; b) the data sample came from the Federal Reserve's functional cost analysis system,
which consists of only 700-800 banks and is not a random sample but rather is a volun-
tary reporting scheme, and likely contains information from a disproportionate number
of banks merely concerned about their costs, id.; c) the studies do not include banks
with over a billion dollars in assets, see, e.g., Benston et al., supra note 179, at 433.
181. See Peter Maloney, Merging Trust Operations, 98 U.S. BANKER,June 1, 1989, at 37-
38 (finding that banks can capitalize on significant economies of scale by combining
trust departments into one operational unit); John P.. Mara, The New Economics of Mort-
gaging, 49 MORTGAGE BANKING, Mar. 1989, at 89-94 (suggesting that technologically
induced economies of scale exist in mortgage banking and servicing and do not dimin-
ish until.volumes reach about $2.5 billion).
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For example, banks must invest in a certain amount of legal work, form
preparation, training, record keeping and other start-up costs to produce
consumer loans. Banks incur these costs irrespective of the number of
loans actually made. Because there is a large fixed-cost start-up expense,
the average cost per loan should decrease as a function of the number of
loans made because the start up cost will be spread over a larger number of
loans. Therefore, all things being equal, the bank that produces more con-
sumer loans should, on average, be able to produce those loans at a lower
average cost than its less productive competitor.' 8 2
Another study found significant economies of scale in compliance cost
for Regulation Z and B for commercial banks at levels of output of up to
375,000 consumer credit accounts, beyond which there are small disecono-
mies of scale.18 3 The study concluded that "at the lowest output levels,
large, unexploited scale economies exist but that scale economies decrease
rapidly as output increases and are exhausted at a moderate level of out-
put." 18 4 Subsequent studies, however, have reached results tending to
show moderate to substanital economies of scale. 185 While the scale econ-
omy debate continues, the studies to date seem to point to three salient
conclusions: (1) within banking organizations, economies of scale may be
modest; (2) with regard to specific high volume products such as credit
cards and checking accounts, the economies of scale may be significant;
and (3) large money center banks do appear to enjoy a cost economy
because they can attract capital at a lower cost than their competitors.18 6
182. More recent studies have specifically investigated whether the production of con-
sumer loans, which have high regulatory compliance costs, display scale economies.
One study found substantial economies of scale in compliance with Regulation B.
Larger banks spent more on compliance than smaller banks, but a 5.7% change in the
cost of compliance was accompanied by a 10% change in the amount of credit extended.
See Neil B. Murphy, Economies of Scale in the Cost of Compliance with Consumer Credit
Protection Laws: The Case of the Implementation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of
1974, 10 J. BANK RES., 248, 250 (1980). This study, however, was based on a very small
sample of banks, and also evaluated the costs of compliance at the outset of Regulation
B's existence. This data may not reflect long run compliance costs because the survey
was conducted less than one year after the original Regulation B became effective. See
GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & ROBERT D. KURTZ, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM, SCALE ECONOMIES AND COMPLIANCE COSTS FOR CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION:
TRUTH-IN-LENDING AND EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY LAWs, Staff Study number 144, 1, n.3
(1985).
183. ELLIEHAUSEN & KURTZ, supra note 182, at 10.
184. Id.
185. See, e.g.,Joseph P. Hughes et al., Efficient Banking Under Interstate Branching, 28
J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANMNG 1045 (1996) (finding relatively large scales of economy that
increase with size and geographic diversity); Joseph P. Hughes & Loretta J. Mester, Bank
Capitalization and Cost: Evidence of Scale Economies in Risk Management and Signaling,
80 REv. ECON. & STAT. 314 (1998) (finding substantial scale economies); Stravos Peris-
tiani, Do Mergers Improve the X-Efficiency of U.S. Banks? Evidence From the 1980s, 29 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANMNG 326 (1997) (acquiring banks experienced moderate improve-
ments in scale efficiency relative to a control group).
186. See PETER S. ROSE, BANKING ACROSS STATE LINES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CONSE-
QUENCES 106-07 (1997) (discussing economy of scale studies). See also Patrick H. McAl-
lister & Douglas McManus, Resolving the Sale Efficiency Puzzle in Banking, 17J. BANKING
& FIN. 389 (1993) (examining returns to scale generally and finding significant scale
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In the NAFTA context, some North American bankers may harbor the
concern that the production of banking products and services could have
such economies of scale that large banking organizations will inevitably
come to dominate the market. 18 7 The economic studies do not consist-
ently support such a conclusion, and experience with the consolidating
banking industry of the 1980s and 1990s has yet to show such a trend.
Even if the threat of large banks is unfounded, however, the perception of a
threat is just as damaging politically, so community banks in the United
States will rail against cross-border branching on the theory that U.S.
money center banks and their huge Canadian and Mexican counterparts
will squeeze small community banks out of the competitive picture
entirely.
III. Possible Resolutions of the Dilemma
If NAFTA'S bank branching provisions are considered in isolation, without
some countervailing bargaining chip to even out the tradeoffs, there will
not be a departure from the status quo. It seems likely that the cross-bor-
der branching issue will not be resolved until there is some exogenous
shock to the status quo that realigns the interests of the players and regula-
tors in the current regime.
One possible source of change might be the resolution of one or more
of the sub-games that influence the strategies of national trade negotiators.
For instance, the turf war in the U.S. federal banking scheme could end
with either the Federal Reserve or the Comptroller of the Currency emerg-
ing as the clear victor.' 8 8 Such a reform could result in a single federal
banking regulator that could influence the NAFTA negotiation without fear
of giving up too much domestic regulatory power. Given the poor track
record of recent attempts by Congress to rebalance the power of the various
federal banking regulators, however, this event may never come to pass.18 9
economies for banks below $500 million in assets, but also finding significant cost
advantages for big banks over smaller banks for financial capital, thereby negating any
diseconomies of scale in pure operating costs).
187. The data do not clearly support the contention that large banks enjoy economies
of scale. Hence, the predictions of the demise of the small community bank appear to be
greatly exaggerated. See generally DONALD R. FRASER &JAMES W. KoLAu, THE FUTURE OF
SMALL BANKS IN A DEREGULATED ENVIRONMENT (1985); Paul Nadler, Lending Strategies:
Why the Community Bank Thrives, 1 COMM. LENDING REV. 71 (1986).
188. There has been a clamor for a more rational system of banking regulation for
several years. In a recent Congress, the testimony sounded more like a bureaucratic turf
battle than a genuine articulation of the best route for public policy. Although the
immediate prospects for a single federal regulator have passed, the idea retains its attrac-
tiveness. See GAO OVERSIGHT STRUCTURE, supra note 67, at 78 (calling for a reduction in
the number of federal agencies with primary responsibilities for bank oversight).
189. See Kane, Legislative Agenda, supra note 68, at 186-88 (noting the turf battle
between the Federal Reserve Board and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
over authorization and oversight of new banking powers); see also Yonan, supra note 76
(describing an incipient turf battle between the Treasury Department and the Federal
Reserve Board over the structure of the banking industry).
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Alternatively, regulators in the North American countries could bow
to international pressure to make their banking markets more open, espe-
cially with regard to branching. Currently, Canada and Mexico are the
only countries of the top 50 economies that do not permit foreign branch-
ing.190 In addition, the United States is sometimes criticized for not being
a sufficiently open banking market. However, it is hard to imagine that this
will come to pass without some other event to make it worthwhile, since
the United States has refused to sign on to the GATS on the ground that
other countries' banking schemes are not as liberal as the existing U.S.
scheme. The United States did not want to be locked into the requirement
of national treatment unless U.S. financial services providers would have
access to foreign markets on terms at least as liberal as those provided to
foreign firms by the United States.' 91 On the other hand, the United States
does want to expand NAFTA into the Free Trade Agreement of the Ameri-
cas, 192 and if Canada and Mexico want to be part of that arrangement they
may have to make their banking markets more accessible.
Nevertheless, as discussed above, 193 there may be some pressure for
the three North American bank regulatory schemes to converge naturally,
thereby making concerns over branching and subsidiary operation less
important. Even unilateral liberalization may be possible. In Canada, for
example, industry players seem to be chafing at the protectionist bent of
existing law,194 and that sentiment may presage a change in policy.195
The greatest incentive for harmonization and regulatory cooperation,
however, may be the desire held by both banking regulators and the finan-
cial services industry to foster a stable macroeconomic climate in North
America. Recent experiences with the Asian monetary crisis remind us
that our domestic economy is inextricably entwined with the global econ-
omy. In North America, the peso crisis of 1994 spilled over into other
Latin American countries, especially the leading markets of Brazil, Peru,
190. See Greenberg, supra note 41.
191. See Trachtman, supra note 24, at 51-57 (providing an overview of issues affecting
financial services under the GATS).
192. But cf. Bernard K. Gordon, The Natural Market Fallacy, 77 FoRnIGN AFF. 13, 15
(1998) (criticizing the drive toward expanding NAFTA to the rest of Latin America on
the ground that it will undermine the world trading regime by promoting regionalism).
193. See supra notes 123-35 and accompanying text.
194. See Greenberg, supra note 41 (noting that "most bank chiefs themselves say the
costs of preferential treatment outweigh the benefits").
195. Unfortunately, despite the rising impatience with protective legislation, the Act
introduced to the Canadian Parliament for revising foreign bank branching stipulated
that foreign branches not take retail deposits, that only foreign banks with assets of $35
billion be permitted to branch, that the regulator be empowered to require maintenance
of assets in Canada to cover branch liabilities, that they maintain at least five percent of
branch liabilities with a Canadian depositary institution, that the home bank meet cer-
tain standards of supervisory review, that the branch be subject to Canadian reporting,
auditing and taxation requirements and that the Canadian bank regulator have the
power to seize all assets of the foreign bank to satisfy the liabilities of a branch. These
requirements go a long way toward completely eliminating the benefit of the branch
form of expansion. See Robert E. Elliott, The 1997 Federal Financial Institutions Legisla-
tive Review and Beyond, 16 NA-'L BANKING L. Rxv. 1, 24-25 (1997) (discussing the pro-
posed branching requirements).
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Chile, and Argentina. 196 When instability of global dimensions shakes the
world's financial markets, everyone worries. Both regulators and bankers
may find some value in rationalizing the international regulatory scheme
to enhance stability.197 A harmonized structure could pave the way for
greater regulatory cooperation, which could result in regulators feeling
confident enough to allow branching even though it would mean allowing
the primary regulator to be in the home country. If harmonization does
proceed, the negotiators will need to grapple with the issue of what role, if
any, is left for local control over those matters that are of local importance,
such as lending policies, the availability of credit, and market-related
matters.198
The other sub-game that may eventually lead to a determinate out-
come is the battle in the United States over banking powers. One of the
factors that has paralyzed U.S. banking policy is the existence of too many
industry participants seeking rents from too many political actors. This
results in no one interest group or coalition achieving the critical mass to
move their position forward. If U.S. law moves toward broader product
lines, the traditional battle lines between banks, insurance companies and
securities firms may fall and those former political enemies may begin to
think of themselves as "financial services providers" with a common inter-
est in access to other countries.
Insurance is one product category where this convergence of industry
interests may come to pass. NAFTA contains a provision that requires
renegotiation of insurance powers before January 1, 2000.199 Between the
United States and Canada, there are not many issues relating to insurance
worth fighting about,20 0 but the Mexican insurance market remains largely
closed to foreign investment. Given recent U.S. case law allowing banks
easier access to the insurance business201 and possible explicit authority
in a new banking law, the banking lobby may send the message to our
trade negotiators that Mexican bank branching into the United States will
be an acceptable trade-off in exchange for greater access to Mexico's insur-
ance market.
More importantly, perhaps, will be the realization by regulators and
industry participants that the business of financial intermediation is
changing rapidly and the traditional notion of banking may be supplanted
196. See ScoTr & WELLONS, supra note 22, at 1294.
197. But see WHITE, supra note 9, at 32-37 (arguing that international systemic risk is
not a pressing enough concern, in light of sufficient domestic systemic protection
regimes, to warrant a move toward harmonization).
198. See Dermine, supra note 121, at 70 (noting that some local regulation makes
sense).
199. See NAFTA, supra note 8, at Annex 1404.4, 32 I.L.M. at 662.
200. SeeJordan, supra note 9, at 51 (noting that few restrictions on U.S.-Canada insur-
ance activity existed before or after the FTA).
201. See Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996) (allowing national banks to con-
duct insurance brokerage activities despite state law prohibition on affiliations between
banks and insurance firms); NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251
(1995) (giving the Comptroller of the Currency discretion for determining what prod-
ucts constitute "insurance" for purposes of the National Bank Act).
Vol. 32
1998 Banking in North America
by other service providers that are not subject to the regulations saddling
the banking industry.20 2 Technology could shock the system as well, with
regulators realizing that in the fast changing technological world borders
are increasingly irrelevant to the transaction of banking business. Some
"banking" transactions conducted over the Internet, for example, may
escape effective regulation by "falling through the cracks" of national bor-
ders.203 Perhaps through cooperation, international regulators could
divide the pie of non-bank and internet transactions in a way to preserve
their relative market positions.
If no dramatic shock materializes, though, it seems unlikely that the
deadlock will end. National trade negotiators are not going to give up a
trade provision and its related political support without getting something
in return.204 Although this conclusion seems bleak, it must be so in a
world governed by principles of public choice.
Conclusion
If trade decisions were left to philosopher kings, the NAFTA countries
would permit unfettered cross-border branching. That result would appear
to be the substantively "correct" result as a matter of trade policy, banking
law and corporate law. In trade negotiations, however, countries often
negotiate for outcomes that are not theoretically optimal, but which are
nevertheless politically expedient. One way to think about this departure
from the optimal outcome is to posit that negotiators attempt to maximize
their respective "national interests." The problem with that approach is
that nations do not have "interests" in any meaningful sense. It is more
appropriate to consider government action as being the result of interest
group bargaining.
In the case of trade agreements, it is important to consider domestic
regulators of the financial services industry as players in the rent-seeking
calculus. As discussed above, banking regulators in each NAFTA country
have built-in incentives to prefer the subsidiary device over branching.
Industry groups also should prefer the subsidiary approach because the
current North American market is already well-served by big banks that
have a presence in all three countries through the subsidiary device. They
have little to gain by switching to the branch structure at this point, and
much to lose because a change to allow branching will permit late partici-
pants to get into Mexico and Canada on a low cost basis.
202. See Peter Coy, Doing Business, Bus. WK., Aug. 31, 1998, at 98, 101 (suggesting
that in the financial services market of the 21st Century, intermediation may be carried
out by non-bank, non-insurance firms such as rating agencies).
203. See FREEDMAN & GOODLET, supra note 144, at 38 (noting difficulties of regulating
financial services on the internet); Richard Blackwell, Under Siege: So What?, FIN. POST,
Oct. 4, 1997, at 12 (noting the concern of Canadian regulators that they may be losing
regulatory authority over "Canadian" banking transactions conducted over the internet).
204. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 293 (noting the need for compensating trade in
negotiation).
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The deadlock in favor of subsidiaries is likely to persist until an exoge-
nous shock to the North American banking system shakes up the current
order. That shock could take the form of changes in the domestic regula-
tory schemes that change the international dynamic, or concerns about
macroeconomic stability, or marketplace developments in the delivery of
financial services that threaten to make banking obsolete. In any event, the
players involved in shaping North American banking policy will not act
until pushed to do so.
